1. Introduction

This paper considers university governance and management in the UK in the context of neoliberal, public sector reforms. It is argued that the current pressure to reform university governance in the UK is related to this new style of relationship of the State and the University. The shift is shown in the terms of higher education funding and the government’s regulatory mechanisms to audit university performance to ensure public accountability. The paper notes distinctive features of the recent changes in the legal and regulatory framework of university governance. The analysis concludes with some critical and comparative comments on the prevailing impact of managerial university governance in the UK.

The concept of ‘governance’ derives from Latin origins that suggest the notion of ‘steering’. The European Union defines ‘governance’ as action by executive bodies, assemblies and judicial bodies in both corporate and State contexts (http://ec.europa.eu/governance/governance/index_en.htm). The World Bank defines governance as the exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society’s problems and affairs (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance).

Behind these definitions is a simple proposition: governance is about power. The concept of governance can be understood as a process of strategic institutional decision-makings, and the authority to determine whom they involve and how and to whom they render account. That is, external relations of power (for example between the State and Universities) will often write, or re-write, the rules and regulations and the institutional architectures which define and illustrate power: the distribution of resources, the roles of academics, the modes of management
of higher educational institutions, and definitions of
good knowledge. Governance not only means rules,
institutionally inscribed, but also organisational re-
sponsiveness – including responsiveness to whom
and for what.

Against this motif, university governance in the
UK currently can be understood in terms of an explo-
sion in the scale and size of what has to be managed;
changes in the way public money is given to univer-
sities and how this is monitored; and who manages
what, and how.

Central to these changes are the ‘new’ politics of
neo-liberalism and economic globalisation, and the
increased public accountability of universities which
is at the heart of higher education reforms in many
countries around the world. In the context of neo-
lберal, public sector reforms, rationales are found in
the concurrent massification of higher education and
globalisation of higher education as business, which
require more effective and efficient use of resources;
and thus legitimise ‘professional’ management.

In countries such as Australia, Britain, Canada,
New Zealand and the U.S.A., the welfare role of the
State as regulator and purveyor of higher education,
on the historical assumption that higher education is
a public good, has been altered. The argument that
the provision of higher education is part of a market
has not only been accepted at the policy level, but is
also directing the reforms of university governance
in the UK (as well as other places). The current UK
higher education system can be described as ‘mar-
et-framed’ (Cowen, 2000).

What is distinctive in the current UK higher
education system, from an East Asian perspective, is
that British universities - except one (the University
of Buckingham) - are all “public”. That is, in normal
talk, it can be said that the University of Buckingham
is private and the other universities are ‘public’. This
is unusual from a global perspective. Private higher
education has recently become a global pheno-
menon. In many places – notably the United States, East
Asia¹, and Latin America - private higher education

¹ For instance, the role of Government in higher education is a regu-
lator rather than a purveyor of higher education in Korea. There
are several distinctive features of Korean private higher education.
First, the expansion of Korean higher education has been led by
the Private Sector. Universal access to higher education has been
already realised in Korea: Higher education enrolment rate 82%;
and private higher education accounts for almost the 80% of the
Korean higher education sector. Second, there is lack of strategic
diversification among four-year universities. Korea shows a very
high proportion of four-year general universities producing post-
graduate degrees (about 75%) - Cf. Japan (48.5%); USA (61%).
Third, the high status of private universities in Korea is distinctive:
an average of 8 out of the top 10 universities are Private higher
education institutions in Korea (Kim, 2008).

is strong traditionally, and in Eastern and Central
Europe, the fast growth of private higher education
is dramatic. In contrast, Western Europe (including
the UK) currently remains the only major region in
which private higher education is not emphasised.

However, the practice in the UK, as distinct from
the labelling, has made the situation more complex.
Paradoxically, as Tooley (2001) points out, although
all British universities are in one sense private insti-
tutions and on average less than half of their incomes
comes from direct government grants, they have al-
lowed themselves to fall increasingly under govern-
ment control (Tooley, 2001).

Overall, then the public and private division in
the UK higher education system is not completely
clear-cut especially when it comes to the relations of
the Government and the University. The UK Qual-
ity Assurance Agency (QAA) writes that “universi-
ties and colleges of higher education are private
institutions, but publicly funded… They are autono-
мous; they have intellectual and academic freedom,
and do not have to follow a Government-set curricu-
num.”(www.qaa.ac.uk) (italics added)

The critical point, currently, is not a simple pub-
lic-private distinction but the fact that the perform-
ance of universities is audited to guarantee public
accountability, which in turn is linked to the scale of
government subsidies.

Interpretations of this shift have often been criti-
cal. For example, according to Shattock (1999), uni-
versities have allowed themselves to be downgraded
by their own failure to recognise the implications of
the changed relationship between the Government
and the University that has been consequent on the
move not only to mass higher education, but also to
a new set of political priorities. Following a similar
logic, Dickson (2001) has argued that the relationship
between the Government and the University has be-
come a ‘Faustian bargain’ as the universities are now
‘one of the last semi-nationalised sectors of the British
economy’, used by the government as an instrument
of social policy (Dickson, 2001, 23) - and as part of
national economic survival. (Kim, 2004: 103)

Against this backdrop of the politics of State-
University relations in the UK, the expansion and
control of the system and the regulatory framework
of university governance in the UK can now be not-
ed – along with the patterns of change over the last
fifteen years.

2. Expansion, Control and
Finance of Higher Education

It was during the period of the Thatcher gov-
ernment that neoliberal market principles took firm
The massification of higher education started relatively late but has been rapid in the UK for the last fifteen years or so. Currently around 43% of 18-30 year olds in England enter higher education. Given the ongoing policy of widening participation in higher education and stressing the economic imperative for a high-skilled workforce, the UK government has set a target to increase participation in higher education to 50 per cent of those aged 18-30 by the end of the decade (DfES, 2003: 57).

At the same time, the UK higher education sector has become recognised as a major export earner. British universities are facing increasing demand for places and more competition for international students. Extra recruitment of non-EU students had already generated over £1bn for the UK economy (McNulty, B., 2003). In the recent report, Vision 2020: Forecasting International Student Mobility, the British Council predicts that by 2010 there will be more international postgraduate than undergraduate students in the UK (British Council, 2004).

The neo-liberal market-framed public sector reforms and the changed relations of the State and the University in the UK are likely to be magnified by WTO’s General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS). Given that the majority of UK universities are already engaged in for-profit services, the higher education sector can be fully open to liberalisation under GATS. The UK government’s position so far has been strongly supportive towards the WTO/GATS negotiations (Department of Trade and Industry, UK: http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23034.doc), which is not surprising: after all, the whole thrust of UK government policies and regulatory interventions has been gearing universities to market needs, market principles and corporatist management practices. Overall, the themes of ‘internationalisation’ and ‘massification’ and higher education as an ‘international business’ in an internationally competitive market have been explicitly on the UK government’s higher education agenda over the last twenty years (www.dfes.gov.uk/highereducation/policies.shtml).

Paradoxically, to realize these goals, one of the major policy actions by the UK government was to reduce the unit amounts in higher education funding. Even before the 1988 Education Reform Act, the government (at that time led by Mrs. Thatcher) had moved from providing about 90% of the universities’ budget from public money to providing only 75%. The balance of the public and private contributions to the revenue of UK universities has been fluctuating in line with the changes in the political party in power. For instance, before 1945, public and private resources more or less equally contributed to the revenue of universities, and thereafter the share of public funding increased to reach 90% in 1973 under the Labour government. The balance of 50/50 public and private contributions to the university incomes was restored by 2000 (Carpentier, 2005: 7).

In terms of higher education funding policy, there has been consistency since the Thatcher period. The current government has maintained almost all of the institutional control mechanisms invented by the previous government. The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), which was established following the Further and Higher Education Act of 1992, has funded all higher education institutions in England since April 1993. Similar bodies for funding exist in Wales (HEFCW), Scotland (SHEFC) and Northern Ireland (DENI). The UK higher education sector now relies for less than half its income on public funding. The UK public expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP is at 1.1%, low compared with the US (2.6%) and Scandinavian countries (1.8%) (OECD, 2006).

The reduction in the unit of resource combined with the major growth in student numbers meant that universities were particularly vulnerable to financial incentives and sanctions (e.g. quality-based funding; conditional grants - the need to procure matching funds to qualify; hypothecated funding for the implementation of government goals and policies, such as university-business collaborations).

These mechanisms of finance and the expansion of the university system have helped to reposition the universities politically. Within the new funding regime, the UK government started to formulate goals for the universities and to apply legislative and financial means in order to reach those goals with relatively little consultation with the academic community (Kogan, et.al., 2000: 56-57). A key change has been the abandonment of professional self-government, operating within a ‘corporatist bargain’ (Kogan and Hanney, 2000) in favour of what has been called neo-liberalism.

But there is a central paradox here, observable not only in the UK but also in Australian policy-making. Institutions are exhorted to exhibit diversity and...
act in an academic and knowledge market as traders. At the same time they are required to respond to a flotilla of government prescriptions on such matters. So they are coerced into new and unaccustomed freedoms which do not sit well with traditional notions of academic autonomy and identity (Henkel, 2000; Berdahl, 1999). In the UK, the legitimisation of introducing corporatist management has been notable in the realm of higher education management, emphasising the value of management perceived as innovative, performance-centred, consumer-centred, transparent, externally accountable, market-tested, result oriented, pragmatic and strategic, in comparison with the old academic self-regulating professionalism and bureaucracy (Clarke and Newman, 1997). In terms of professional accountability, the new public sector management (as the dominant model of knowledge “performance”) has been altering the nature of academic profession, shifting the core academic commitment from ‘universal truth’ to ‘quality control/assurance’ in the discourse of ‘excellence’. The new soft power of management theory and practice recognises performance as having acquired a normative force. Accordingly, the emphasis on evidence-based practice/evidence-informed practice has consolidated the performance management further (Boston, et. al., 1996), which has led to the legitimisation of “what counts is what works” in academia as well. The neoliberal public management has also altered the discourse of public accountability: i.e. instrumentalise, individualise, standardise, marketise and externalise ‘accountability relationships’ at the expense of democratic values such as participation, professional self-regulation, collegiality, and collective deliberation that are said to enhance and thicken the relationships involved. (Tolofari, 2005)

Overall, the new public management and accountability relationships in the UK have extended into a rationale for the reform of university governing bodies.

3. Ruling and Regulating

It was the Dearing Report (1997) that first suggested a maximum size for the university governing body and the need for a stronger code of good governance for the UK higher education sector. More recently the Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration (2003) was conducted to address a perceived weakness in higher education governance and management. The Lambert Report (2003) was critical of the fact that many of the Dearing recommendations had not been implemented, and urged the Committee of University Chairmen (CUC) to develop ‘a concise code of governance representing best practice across the sector’. The Lambert Report included a draft code which the CUC should use as a starting point. This stipulated that each university should be able clearly to identify its governing body, that it should have a maximum of twenty-five members and a majority of lay members (Lambert Report, 2003, Recommendation 7.1: 99). Discussions about university governance reforms are ongoing in the UK, in the light of the Lambert Review of Business–University Collaboration (2003) and the Charities Bill (which had completed its passage through the House of Lords in November 2005, and the Lords consideration of commons amendments took place on 7 November 2006, with Royal Assent signalled the following day.\(^2\)

In terms of the legal framework, UK universities simultaneously operate in the public sector, the charitable sector, the not-for-profit sector, and the business sector. Most universities are charities, with ‘exempt status’ (which means that they are exempt from registration with, and regulation by, the Charity Commission)\(^3\)

Universities (established before 1992) are chartered corporations in the UK. The legal status of these universities derives from a Royal Charter granted by the Queen. The Royal Charter provides a constitution and statutes - the general regulations under which a university should operate. On the other hand, many former polytechnics, which became universities following the 1992 ‘Further and Higher Education Act’, are formally constituted as higher education corporations. The incorporated polytechnics and their successor, new (post-92) universities were not given a charter but a legal prescription for the number and sources of their governing boards. The powers and duties of their governing boards were also prescribed by the government, which clearly distinguishes them from the traditional (pre-92) universities’ Councils (Fulton, 2002: 193-195).

However, despite these variations in governance system, there have been increasing signs of conformity in the UK higher education sector over the last decade. The government has developed ‘how to’ handbooks with a code of ‘good, or even best, practice’ which encourage a single standard model of good governance for the sector. The model of good governance with ‘non-executive directors’ represen-

	law_and_regulation/charities_act_2006/ 
	background.aspx.

\(^3\) Charity Commission. Universities UK, http://www.universities- 
	uk.ac.uk/parliament/showBriefing.asp?id=48.
tating shareholder interests and monitoring the activity of ‘executives’ suggested for universities is directly drawn from ‘good practice’ recommended for private sector corporations (Shattock, 1999: 277-278).

The formal structure of university governance in the British model basically consists of ‘Council’ and ‘Senate’. Council as the principal policy-making body comprises a mix of independent “lay” members, and members of academic and support staff and students of the University. Council is responsible for the strategic direction and academic policy of the university. Council nominates the Chancellor, Pro-Chancellors and Treasurer for appointment by Court, and appoints the Vice-Chancellor and Pro-Vice-Chancellors after consultation with Senate.

The ‘Senate’, the academic governing body of the University is, in general, chaired by the Vice-Chancellor and has a number of committees to assist it in its work. The Vice-Chancellor is the academic leader and chief executive of the University. The official role of the Vice-Chancellor is to provide strategic direction and leadership for the University, and to position and represent the University internationally, nationally and regionally and among the duties of the Vice-Chancellor is the financial management of the University within broad policies laid down by the Council and in accordance with funding council requirements.

4. Shifting Patterns of Power: Quality Measurement and Institutional Effects

It has been a matter of considerable discourse in the last decade that university governance has shifted from ‘the professoriate’ to managers – who are in turn subject to the external market and state regulations.

There is enough evidence in the official websites of many old universities in the UK, which confirm the role of Vice-Chancellor as the Chief Executive Officer: “Under the present arrangements the Vice-Chancellor is both the chief executive officer and Chairman of Council.” (http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/po/governance.shtml) “The Vice-Chancellor is the Chief Officer of the University in securing and continuing the growth of the University’s financial base, and takes a principal role in the University’s fundraising.”(www.ox.ac.uk/aboutoxford/vcrole.shtml).

This new culture in university governance has been perceived critically by many academics. For example, Ryder comments that “University Senates or Councils have been dispensed with in the name of efficiency, and replaced by a kind of University Po-litburo which operates behind closed doors” (Ryder, 1996: 58). University academics are increasingly being defined as employees, subject to management. Cowen has pointed out, succinctly, that: “Those who profess and provide academic leadership are replaced by those who manage and organise academics. Discourse about academic leadership shifts into discourse about successful management” (Cowen, 2000). The shift is not merely that managers are more powerful than professors. The professors are now both managers and clerks. New career opportunities open up. The University is a new site of opportunity for non-knowledge work (ibid).

In the current market-framed culture of management, a new audit culture has been entrenched in universities in the UK: academics are being redefined as ‘units of resource’ (Shore and Wright 1999:561), whose performance and productivity must constantly be audited through the Quality Assurance Agency’s code of practice and the assessment process of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the forthcoming Research Excellence Framework (REF). The mechanism (which is currently under review) is that the money for university research is distributed by the Higher Education Funding Councils, and calculated using the RAE. Universities conducting ‘the best’ research receive a larger proportion of the available grant. University budgets and national rankings are mostly dependent on the RAE results (Kim, 2006: 201). The invention of a variety of so-called ‘quality assurance’ mechanisms included the measurement of quality of university teaching as well as research outputs to make the performance of universities transparent to the public gaze. The reputations of universities and their revenues, and individual academics’ promotions, have been all affected by RAE and QAA results (Cave, et. al., 1997).

These new mechanisms of higher education funding allocation have restructured the external relations of universities, their legitimation in terms of their performance, and their internal governing structure and management process. Internally, the traditional control of the academic individual, with institutional governance characterised by collegiality (Shattock, 1999; Tapper and Palfreyman, 2000) has now been replaced with a new style of managerial governance. Dopson and McNay (1996) argue that “collegiality may not be efficient by the norms of other organisations, but it may be more effective in achieving the outcome of a “good university” than rampant managerialism” (Dopson and McNay, 1996: 30-31; reprinted from Tapper and Palfreyman, 2000:20).
However, the Vice-Chancellor of the University of London, Sir Graeme Davies, a New Zealand engineer and academician, who was first a Vice-Chancellor at Liverpool and then Glasgow before coming to the University of London, and has also served as Chief Executive of the UK Higher Education Funding Council (HEFCE), confirms that the changes in higher education governance and leadership have defined universities as a business (The Guardian, April 1, 2003). The new manager-academics have a common pattern of managerial behaviour in the UK universities. They initiate changes in a new place immediately after arrival. They stress the need for restructuring university governance and tackle human resource issues. This pattern of university management is in line with the government’s neoliberal public policies: corporatist values and market-oriented efficiency, immediate practical usefulness, and marketable outcomes seem to have become a common recipe for successful university governance. Based on data taken from a recent research project on the management of UK higher education, Deem and Brehony (2005) suggest that the new management ideologies indeed seem to be powerful, even in contexts like universities which were not traditionally associated with the dominance of management.

It has been also notable in the UK higher education sector that some universities (including major and ancient ones) have recruited international manager-academics (e.g. Vice-Chancellors and Pro Vice-Chancellors from the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, China, etc.). The recruitment of manager-academics from overseas at major UK higher education institutions (e.g. at Warwick, LBS, Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Open University, SOAS, and Brunel) hints at the changing nature of British university governance.

For instance, at the University of Oxford, there has been a serious feud between dons about reforms to the university’s governance and management structure, especially since the arrival of the new Vice-Chancellor, Professor John Hood - a New Zealander who used to be the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Auckland before he came to Oxford. He is the first person in Oxford’s 900 year history to be elected to the Vice-Chancellorship from outside the University’s current academic body (http://www.ox.ac.uk/aboutoxford/vc.shtml). Soon after his arrival in October 2004, the traditional Oxford governing structure started to be reviewed, which was conducted by the Working Party established by Council. In the review process, there have been proposals to reform the traditional Oxford university self-governing structure.

The plans for the new composition of Council with a majority of external/independent members, i.e. bringing outside business people onto Oxford’s executive body, have stirred up many confrontations: “There are many things to fix in this University. I cannot understand why he does not get on and fix them, rather than publicly staking out the big strategic issue of governance and the big structural issue of academic strategy. These are such big and difficult issues to deal with, and attempting to deal with them so quickly after he arrived here has created a huge unnecessary distraction. It has also frightened some of the people who will find it difficult to adjust to the necessary changes” (Oxford Magazine, No. 240, Eighth Week Trinity Term 2005, p. 11).

The formal report by the Working Party, described as a University White Paper, came out in June 2006. It contains a series of recommendations on university governance procedures in Oxford, and recommends a number of practical changes to University structures and procedures, which in general corresponds to the recommendations made by the Lambert Report. These include modifying the size and composition of Council as discussed earlier, and the establishment of an Academic Board to oversee the academic activity of the University. The Oxford White Paper of University Governance proposes to change the composition of Council from twenty-five members and three co-opted member to fifteen members, chaired by a lay member of Council, and consisting of a further seven lay members (who will nevertheless become members of Congregation), and seven internal members (who are members of Congregation) amongst whom will be included the Vice-Chancellor and Chair of Conference of Colleges ex officio (University of Oxford, White Paper on University Governance, 2006: 25, #76-77). However, it stipulates that the over-arching powers of Congregation, the University’s parliament, would be unaffected. Congregation, therefore, would remain sovereign over the University, which can bind Council, and which has the power to pass a vote of no confidence in Council (University of Oxford, White Paper on University Governance, 2006: 14, #46). The dispute was very public, and was attracting major press coverage. Eventually, the beleaguered VC of Oxford, Professor John Hood announced in November 2007 that he would leave the institution when his five-year term comes to an end in September 2009. The decision is not being seen as a resignation. However, Hood’s tenure has been beset by arguments with aca-
demics angry with his moves to usurp their power in steering the 900-year-old university (The Guardian, 15 November 2007).

Overall, given the new complexity of corporatist university governance - and its new styles - it has been suggested that there is a growing need for new leadership and trained managers in UK universities. A former Vice-Chancellor of Exeter, Sir Geoffrey Holland, asserts: “There are few sectors of our society so amateur, so apparently unconcerned, as higher education about the development of its leaders” (The Guardian April 1, 2003). The government’s proposal in the White Paper (2003) also confirmed the need for new leadership and for trained managers in the UK higher education sector: Because leadership and management are key to the challenges ahead, we will help to fund HEFCE’s and Universities UK’s proposal for a new Leadership Foundation to support the sector to improve leadership and management (DJES, 2003: 76).

The DfES in the Report, ‘The Regulatory Impact of Assessment’ (2004) also stresses the necessity to identify leadership and management needs across the sector, and to build a cadre of professional leaders and managers. More universities have reportedly made plans to increase their spending on leadership and management development, suggesting that a demand for major leadership training in higher education in the UK exists. That, given the scale of change, is not surprising.

**Conclusion**

Overall, it can be suggested that the recent changes in the UK higher education system make a pattern in which speed, expansion, new definitions of quality and new modes of governance come together - with finance.

From the early 1990s, the speed of higher education reforms and the expansion of the sector have been noticeable. The abolition of the binary higher education structure in 1992 was a sudden but fundamental turning point in transforming the UK higher education sector, from complexity to simplicity. The formerly diverse institutional types became unified simply by re-naming - all became universities. With expansion came issues of how the system should be financed and managed.

In the expansion, the new power relations between the UK Government and the University became visible. The new contractual relationship between the Government and the University defined the new terms and conditions of higher education funding, and they have achieved operational uniformality in the UK higher education system in a short period of time. Standardised rules and regulations drawn from a business model were applied to university governance and management on a national scale.

The current shift in patterns of finance (from government to ‘other source’ funding) is remarkable. The audit mechanisms which strongly influence UK higher education funding are a radical and significant device for the assurance of public accountability and the creation of the new market-framed university system in the UK. The UK RAE (Research Assessment Exercise) and TQA (Teaching Quality Assessment) policy and practice have been also benchmarked globally by many other national governments.

By 2000 managerial governance was evident in UK universities and increasingly university academics are classified in managerial terms. The changes in university governance were made more visible with the new pattern of appointment of foreign Vice-Chancellors from abroad, signs perhaps of the end of the traditional English university collegial style of governance. New forms of external and internal managerial power are beginning to redefine the British academic profession.

The day-to-day consequences of this in university academic life in Britain, including the frequency and intensity of the measurement of academic performance, have become matters of complaint. The UK University and College Union (UCU) has recently published a list of what is perceived by working academics as the worst aspect of their jobs which includes: bureaucracy and having to do lots of administrative interference and targets, isolation/lack of respect, low pay, and job insecurity. According to the HESA data (published in The Times Higher Educational Supplement on 21 May 2004), the casualisation of academic labour is noticeable among UK universities. At the University of Cambridge, for instance, only 25.8% of the academic staff are on full-time permanent contracts, and similarly at Imperial College, London, and Oxford, and the UCL (University College London), the proportion is 28.3% and 31.9% and 33.0% respectively. According to a recent poll commissioned by the UCU, nearly two thirds of UK academics are considering quitting the UK to work abroad (UCU, August 2006: http://www.ucu.org.uk/media/pdf/6/s/yougovucupoll06_worstaspect_1.pdf).

Finally it can be suggested that there has been a loss of dignity in the academic profession. Every aspect of academic life seems to be subject to man-
agement in UK universities now, including managerial definitions of human relations in the university which define rules about bullying, harassment and so on. These internal rules and regulations have been written out and published as an act of management in UK universities. The emergence of managerial rules about how to treat others – while very politically correct – can also be taken as a signifier of the corrosions and corruptions and damage which ‘being managed’ is creating in the UK university – and the need to write more rules to control that damage.

The paradox of course is that the new forms of governance in the UK university system were going to improve its levels of efficiency, and make institutions leaner, meaner and more flexible. So far there is evidence that they have some new inflexibilities, and that they are meaner - though not perhaps in the sense intended by reformers.

The new corporatist governance model relies on top down leadership which is transforming universities from collegial bodies to top down managed ones. Not only is there no evidence to support this change, which is essentially doctrinaire and market driven, but it ignores the essential differences between universities and business – e.g. the different objectives and time scales - and has been questioned for the professions quite generally (Handy, 1984; Elton, 2008). It has become increasingly evident that such top down management/leadership leads to resentful opposition from the body of academics; and there is no evidence whatever that such leaders have the necessary wisdom.

These corrosions are pronounced in the UK. The comparative question is: whether these patterns will emerge in other countries, and why these patterns have not already emerged in all neo-liberal States, which have been affected by ideologies of economic globalisation and notions of economically relevant universities.

References


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According to a recent survey, which is a part of the ongoing international study, ‘The Changing Academic Profession’, majority of UK academics fear funding pressures and targets will harm scholarly work (The Times Higher Education, 10 April 2008). The changes in the UK academic profession can be referred to as the “late industrialisation” of academia. It could be argued that this transformation is intimately linked with the development of mass higher education and the shift from craft to mass production (ibid).
Changing university governance and management in the UK and elsewhere under market conditions: issues of quality ...


UNIVERSITETŲ VALDYMO IR VADYBOS POKYČIAI RINKOS SĄLYGOMIS JUNGTINĖJE KARALYSTĖJE IR KITOSE VALSTYBĖSE: KOKYBĖS GARANTIJOS IR ATSKAITOMYBĖ

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