FROM REACTIVE POLICING TO CROWD MANAGEMENT?:
POLICING ANTI-GLOBALIZATION PROTEST IN CANADA

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Keywords: Public order policing, anti-globalization protest, G8, Canada.

Summary

There has been some significant debate over the last decade concerning a purported trend in ‘Western’ public order policing policy and practices away from a primarily reactive, confrontational and protester dispersal model, to one that is based more within the notion of de-escalation of conflict, entailing intelligence-led policing, mutual communication and negotiated accommodation, i.e. towards the ‘management’ of crowds. The reasons for such a shift have been located variously within a general movement towards a more liberal democratic society in these countries, and the process of social change generally, resulting in an increasing movement from modern to advanced-modern society. Again, the reasons why the police are involved in this developmental change is seen as being due to their relationship with the state, concerns about legitimate action and their operating within an increasingly risk-based society. However, the police themselves are not solely effecting change by responding to external pressure, but also act as agents for change themselves on the basis of police knowledge and lessons learned.

Research to date on these issues has largely focused on Western Europe and the US rather than Canada, and in the main draws from public order events other than that of anti-globalization protest. This article redresses this lack by mounting a comparative study of the policing of two anti-globalization protest events in Canada, namely the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001 and the 2002 G8 conference in Kananaskis and anti-G8 protests in Calgary and Ottawa, drawing from interviews conducted by the author with public police agencies across Canada in the summer of 2003. The first event took place shortly before Genoa, with similar perimeter fence logistics and confrontational engagement. The second occurred within a frame of post-9/11 heightened fears of terrorism, but were relatively non-confrontational, and whilst the Kananaskis rocky mountain site was heavily exclusionary and military, policing in the cities involved an intelligence-based, ‘soft-hat’, protester and stakeholder liaison remit. Superficially on the basis of these two case-studies, it would indeed appear that the policing of anti-globalization protest in Canada has moved from a primarily reactive model to one that is more focused on crowd management. However, in order to contextualize these contrasting events and locate the processes for such policing change in more depth, this article examines five Canadian public order policing event ‘watersheds’ that occurred between 1997 and 2001.

1 An earlier version of this article, entitled ‘D’une gestion policière réactive à la gestion des manifestants? La police et les manifestations anti-mondialisation au Canada’ was published in Cultures & Conflits, (2004) 56:209-247.
Introduction

Contemporary ‘Western’ public order policing would seem to increasingly be moving away from being a reactive incident-led process to one that is more intelligence-led, with the latter entailing a combination of intelligence gathering, surveillance, negotiation, contingency policing and policing by accommodation. Research has identified this trend in England and Wales (Brearley and King, 1996; King and Brearley, 1996) as well as in other European countries (della Porta and Reiter, 1998). It has also been argued that the above trend is inextricably linked to the wider shift from modern to advanced modern society, and in turn policing (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Reiner, 1998; Wright, 2002).

This article will explore these issues further by examining public order policing developments in Canada through a comparative study of the policing of two anti-globalization protest events, namely the 2001 Summit of Americas in Quebec City and the 2002 G8 meeting held in Kananaskis. The first entailed the erection of an exclusionary fence, with similar violent consequences to Genoa which followed three months later; the second was held in a remote Rockies location and passed in relative calm, as did protests in the major Canadian cities. These two events are contextualized by referring to a number of ‘watersheds’ in the policing of protest, largely resulting in policing policy change. Whilst stressing the role of ‘lessons learned’ in determining such change, the paper identifies a policy shift from reactive policing to crowd management in Canada, although it questions the extent to which this policy has been translated into practice, and posits limitations of this development with respect to the policing of anti-globalization protest. In particular, it agrees with Ericson and Doyle's (1999) assertion that where international dignitaries are present, policing will generally be more overtly coercive and exclusionary. The paper draws from archive research and interviews with public police agencies across Canada conducted by the author in the summer of 2003.

Policing trends

We have argued elsewhere (Brearley and King, 1996; King and Brearley, 1996; King, 1997) that historically developments in public order policing have largely been incident-led reactions to the changing nature and form of protest. On this basis, we identified a number of categories to which police applied to demonstrators which primarily determined the policing approach. These categories (excluding those relating to sporting events) comprised a 4-fold typology, namely political, industrial, exclusionary. The paper draws from archive research and interviews with public police agencies across Canada conducted by the author in the summer of 2003.

1 This research was funded by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade as part of its Canadian Studies Faculty Research Program. The author would like to express his thanks to those current and former officers from the Calgary Police Service, Ontario Provincial Police, Ottawa Police Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Sûreté du Québec, Vancouver Police Department, and Ville de Québec, who made this research possible. Keith Taylor, Simon Fraser University (whilst the author was visiting research fellow), the Justice Institute of British Columbia and the Canadian Police College, Ottawa, also kindly provided invaluable support and resources.

2 We use the term ‘anti-globalisation’ throughout, as a collective term for the protest movement, but recognise that it is composed of many different individuals and interest groups, not necessarily associated with each other, ranging from those supporting global justice, to anti-capitalism, to environmental issues, to anarchism.

3 Although, it is important to note that there was no demonstrator fatality, nor police-shooting in the Quebec city event.

4 This is not to suggest that the policing of a particular event is simply reactive to the level of disorder within that event, nor is it to suggest that forms of protest develop somehow independent from policing strategies and tactics. Rather, there is a dynamic interaction between the police and protesters, and even the very presence of police at a demonstration may instigate confrontation (Olten, et al., 2001; D. Waddington et al., 1989; D. Waddington, 1992; P. Waddington, 2003).
festival and urban, although admittedly they were not necessarily mutually exclusive (King and Brearley, 1996: 36). However, such categories did not include the newer forms of social protest, such as environmental protest, animal rights (Critcher, 1996), and more recently anti-capitalism and anti-globalization (Callinicos, 2003; della Porta and Diani, 1999), entailing more diversified protestor groups.

There has, however, been recognition on the part of the police that policing on the basis of the above typology was increasingly out of step with much contemporary protest. For example, a 1999 report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) assessing public order policing in England and Wales found that whereas in the contemporary condition the ‘nature of potential disorder is broadening’ to encompass ‘environmental and associated issues’, many forces were still employing outmoded ‘strategies, tactics and equipment’ based upon the reactive experiences of urban riots of the 1980s and early 1990s (HMIC, 1999: 5, 9). In Canada too, it has been argued that much public order policing has been framed within a reactive model. Indeed, a Commission of Inquiry into policing in British Columbia chaired by Mr. Justice Oppal reported that the policing system generally was ‘incident driven … and reactive in nature’ (Oppal, 1994; vii). In contrast, in an earlier study of public order policing in Canada, we identified two distinct trends. On the one hand this involved an increasing (re-)paramilitarisation, whereas on the other hand, there was a move towards consultation and negotiation with protest groups (King, 1997).

The trend from reaction to newer forms of public order policing engagement with more contemporary dissent especially entails an enhanced use of and reliance on intelligence, infiltration of targeted groups and surveillance. This trend is something which King and Brearley (1996) point to in their work, drawing from interviews with police officers in England and Wales, and is similarly identified by della Porta and Reiter (1998) and della Porta and Diani (1999) regarding Western European public police agencies generally. This primarily takes the form of covert pre-event intelligence gathering procedures, including the development of community tension indicator systems (King and Bearley, 1996; HMIC, 1999; ACPO, 2001). The latter are designed to alert the police to any changes in a given community or policing district that may indicate heightened tension which could, if left unmanaged, lead to a riotous situation developing. Accordingly, community tension indicator systems are seen as an important basis for contingency planning and de-escalation of potential conflict. Della Porta (1998: 238) also stresses that there is a similar development of ‘information techniques’, in particular ‘those allowing surveillance at a distance’. In this respect too, King and Brearley (1996: 96-7) note an increasing concentration on the covert and overt use of pre-, during and post-event evidence gathering. Indeed, in England and Wales it has been recognized by the police that ‘intelligence is the life-blood of conflict management’ and that ‘forces should combine all operational intelligence and information systems, to form one integrated conflict management database’ (ACPO, 1998: 7).2 We find a similar trend regarding the role that intelligence plays in the policing of anti-globalization protest in Canada, which we turn to later.

It has been argued that another dimension to the contemporary trend in public order policing strategy and tactics, but one that goes hand in hand with intelligence is that of negotiation and accommodation. Della Porta (1998: 250) distinguishes between four models of controlling public order: ‘cooperation’, typified by collaboration between police and demonstrators, as well as low-profile policing; ‘negotiation’, where the police act as mediators between demonstrators and affected non-demonstrators; ‘ritualistic standoff’, which is comprised of a more conflictual, although still distanced, approach, and ‘total control’, with saturation and combative policing. These fit neatly with Brewer et al’s (1996: 230-232) three categories depicting ‘state strategies in public order policing’, namely the ‘criminalization’ of protest, entailing its de-politicization, marginalization and de-legitimation; ‘accommodation’, being the pursuit of conflict-resolution, perhaps even the attempt to meet protestors’ grievances, and ‘suppression’, perhaps through Emergency legislation or repressive policing. There would seem to be a broad congruence between della Porta’s control models and Brewer et al’s strategic categories in respect of cooperation, negotiation and accommodation, and

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1 There has been some debate concerning the use of the term ‘paramilitary’ in this context. Whereas P. Waddington (1999: 93) now accepts Hills’ (1995) preferred term of ‘militarisation’, Johnston (2000: 103) argues that Hills proffers a too ‘rigid demarcation of civil and military action’, his preferring ‘paramilitarisation’, being a ‘fusion of civil and military action’. We agree with this, our following Wright’s (2002: 64) definition of ‘paramilitary’ as ‘a coordinated form of action by police units which use military-style deployments with tactical coordination and rules of engagement’.

2 It is also argued that in this respect ‘Disorder should be regarded and dealt with as an integral part of crime and visa versa’ (ACPO, 1998: 7). Tilley (2003) explores this notion of intelligence-led crime management in relation to the National Intelligence Model developed by the National Criminal Intelligence Service for police forces in England and Wales.
both argue that these, respectively, are in line with contemporary public order policing developments within liberal-democratic states. Similarly, McPhail et al. (1998) identify a developmental process from an ‘escalated force’ model of public order policing policies and practices in the US during the 1960s to that of ‘negotiated management’ in the 1980s and 1990s. The first model has a primary goal of protester dispersal, whereas the latter is characterized more by the recognition of the right to demonstrate, accepting the inevitability of limited disruption, the need for communication, and the exercise of discretion in the use of force and arrest-making.\(^1\) (McPhail et al., 1998: 50-54).

Some contributors would conceptually go further than simply pointing to these developments as being part of the contemporary ‘liberal democratic’ process, by firmly locating such developments within the movement from modern to late-modern\(^2\) society and, consequently, policing. Wright (2002: 41, 64), for example, argues that a ‘late-modern mode of policing practice’ specifically entails a process of proactive ‘peacekeeping’ rather than simply order maintenance, but retaining paramilitary policing as a contingent reserve. Reiner (1998: 47-48) too suggests that public order policing has taken a ‘postmodern turn’, albeit there being ‘no diminution in police maintenance of paramilitary capacity’. Indeed, Johnston (2000: 18, 104-105) argues that such ‘risk-based’ pre-emptive policing strategies and practices that we have outlined above lie at the very ‘heart of late modernity’.\(^3\) Whilst King and Waddington (2004) agree with this conceptualization, and elaborate the incorporation of such strategies into public order policing strategies in England and Wales, they question the extent to which these strategies have been translated into practice. This also is something that this paper will consider later with regard to Canada.

There are also a number of qualifications that need to be made to the notions of negotiation and accommodation. First, one can even question on this basis, as we do in our concluding discussion, the extent to which they are superficial and more legitimatory manifestations of the deeper intrusive nature of intelligence gathering. Secondly, we should note that for these strategies to potentially work, the demonstrator groups need to be organized with representatives with whom the police may have discourse. In the words of P. Waddington (2003: 131), demonstrators themselves must ‘play the game’, even to the extent to which they become ‘institutionalized’ (Geary, 1985). Where this is not the case, and we shall discuss later the extent to which the latter applies to contemporary anti-globalization protest, Mawby (2002: 159-160) notes that the police rely even more on the ‘intelligence’ element referred to above.

As indicated earlier by King (1997) in relation to Canadian policing developments, and Wright (2002) and Reiner (1998) above, the policing of public order would seem to be taking a two-pronged approach: one being an increasing move away from (re-)active repressive policing to that of proactive negotiation and accommodation for some, involving a heightened use of intelligence; the other retaining a paramilitary contingency component. Brearley and King (1996) refer to this dual nature of much contemporary public order policing strategy and tactics through the analogy of an ‘iron fist in a velvet glove’. As to which methods are engaged against specific demonstrator categories or events is, according to Wisler and Tackenberg (2000), largely determined by what they call the ‘public sphere’, namely the political and media context.\(^4\) Certainly, it could be argued that the immediate political context frames the way an event is policed, and that context being in flux and contestation during an event may even change the policing policy. However, another important dimension to be taken into account is that of ‘police knowledge’. Indeed, della Porta (1995; 1998) argues that it is this which ultimately plays a paramount role in determining the policing form. Not only is ‘protest policing ..., eventually, influenced by the preference of the bureaucracy that implements policy choices: the police’ (della Porta, 1995: 81), but it does this by sorting and sifting the messages, influences, priorities and directives from ‘public sphere’. In this respect della Porta and Reiter (1998:9, 22) suggest that ‘For organizational features, police culture, governments, public opinion, and interaction

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1. Earl et al. (2003) sensitise this ‘escalated force’ category somewhat by suggesting that even within the escalated force era there was a selective attendance by police at protest events. According to their examination of 1,905 protest events in New York State that occurred between 1968-1973, there was only a police presence at 31% of these. Whether to attend or not seemed to depend on the police perception of ‘threat’, in turn related to the numbers of expected protesters, the likelihood of protestor ‘conflict tactics’, and the extent to which the protest groups were regarded as espousing ‘radical goals’ (Earl et al., 2003: 596).

2. We use the term ‘late-modern’ as opposed to ‘postmodern’ on the same basis as Johnston (2000) and Wright (2002), namely that there are still modern elements in the contemporary condition.

3. The developments in public order policing would seem to be mirrored somewhat in contemporary risk-based corporate strategy and practices generally. In regard to the latter, Johnston and Shearing (2003: 80-81) refer to three elements of this, namely ‘population management’, entailing the ‘observation, containment, control or exclusion of persons’; ‘opportunity management’, and ‘intelligence management’, being ‘fundamental to all security practices’ and ‘inscribed within each’ of the other elements.

4. This being somewhat in line with Brewer et al.’s (1996) symbiotic ‘policing - politics relation’.
with protesters to have an influence on protest policing styles, their input has to be taken up by the police and transformed into knowledge‘, and thereby police knowledge is ‘the main intervening variable between structure and action’.

We have argued elsewhere (Brearley and King, 1996; King and Brearley, 1996) that such knowledge is largely gained on the basis of ‘lessons learned’ through certain identifiable ‘watersheds’ in police – protester engagements which cause reflection and reassessment of current policing policy and practice by the police. Della Porta and Reiter (1998: 20, 30) reinforce this by arguing that ‘The police, in fact, seem to be equipped with an elephants memory; the history of previous interactions with protesters is an important element shaping today’s protest policing’, indeed with the effect that ‘it prevents the police from anticipating change’. These issues of police knowledge and lessons learned are explored further in this paper as a fundamental basis towards explaining current public order policing in Canada, to which we now turn.

**Summit of the Americas, Quebec City - 20-22 April 2001**

It was announced at the second Summit of the Americas (comprising 34 American heads of state1) held in Santiago in 1998 that the site of the third summit would be Quebec City in April 2001. It was also indicated that the contentious issue of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (extending the current North American Free Trade Association) would be on the agenda for that meeting (Killam, 2001:29). This provided a three-year lead-in time for both the policing operation and protester activities. In the event, the primary policing priorities were the protection of the visiting dignitaries and non-disruption of the summit (RCMP, SQ and VQ interviews). To this end, the police employed a fortress mentality, utilizing stand-off policing tactics, and mounted what at that time constituted the largest police operation in the history of Canada, involving a budgetary expenditure of over Cdn$100 million on security alone (Chang, et al., 2001: 20; Killam, 2001:30; Ouellette, 2001:4). Not only were over 6,000 police officers deployed, but a 6.1km long security perimeter was demarcated, entailing the incorporation of Quebec City’s ‘natural’ fortress features, plus the construction of a 3.8km 3-metre high chain-link and concrete fence tested to withstand 20,000 pounds of pressure (Chang, et al., 2001:20; Killam, 2001:30).

Four police forces were involved in the policing operation.2 Although there were mutual collaborative decision-making committees established, each force had specific demarcated roles, some of which would be automatically designated by their respective mandates (Sûrete du Québec, 2002). The federal Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), which deployed 3,768 officers3, had the initial responsibility for operational planning and, more specifically, general co-ordination, military liaison (about 680 army personnel were deployed), site security, dignitary protection, public relations, national investigation and threat assessment (Killam, 2001:30; RCMP, Sûrete du Québec and Ville de Québec interviews). Initially, the command tasks of criminal investigation, arrest and court process rested with the Ville de Québec (VQ) municipal force; however, in February 2001 these were re-allocated to the provincial police, the Sûrete du Québec (SQ). From our interviews with SQ and VQ officers, we were informed (respectively) that the reason for this was that ‘the city authority asked the SQ to take over these tasks, and ‘the SQ requested control over municipality policing functions under civil emergency regulations, and were granted it’. This is something which we discuss later with regard to the issue of initial policing strategies and consequent community impacts. The SQ (deploying 2,750 officers) also had the task of civil emergency co-ordination, and co-ordination with provincial and local governments, whereas the VP (deploying 390 officers) had the role of protecting the external perimeter, access for population and summit participants, escort duties, day to day policing and contact with the municipal emergency services, and the policing of unplanned/spontaneous demonstrations (Killam, 2001:30; SQ and VQ interviews). Finally, the Ville de Sainte-Foy police (deploying 75 officers) had a primary remit of securing the airport (SQ and VQ interviews).

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1 Excluding Fidel Castro on the stated grounds of Cuba’s ‘undemocratic’ political system (Schuster, 2001).
2 Public police forces in Canada are principally organised on three levels, namely federal, provincial and municipal, although the majority of provinces contract out their policing services to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as do a number of municipalities.
3 It should be noted that there was some slight variation in deployment statistics supplied by various sources. We have kept to those stated by Killam (2001) where these were specifically (as opposed to approximately) provided.
Klein (2002:145) warns that one should not allocate an ‘organized’ structure on much anti-globalization protest. Rather, ‘there weren’t two protests that took place in Quebec city – one ‘peaceful’ labour march, the other a ‘violent’ [Black Bloc] anarchist riot – there were hundreds of [concerned individuals, small group, family, student] protests’. There were nonetheless three distinct (albeit overlapping) ‘threads’ to the protest: the union march, the street protest and the (alternative) Second Peoples’ Summit teach-in which took place at a site not far from the perimeter fence (Weinstein, 2001:122). We were informed in our interviews with EVA that pre-summit, protest groups in Quebec were mainly disorganized, but the summit provided a focus for grouping, the main anti-FATE protestor organizations being CASA (Summit of Americas Welcoming Committee), CLAC (Anti-Capitalist Convergence), GOMM (Group Against the Globalization of Markets) and OQP2001 (Opération Quebec Printepts 2001) (Weinstein, 2001:122). Estimates of demonstrator numbers vary from 25,000 – 60,000 (Anderson, 2001; Killam, 2001:31). There were ‘open and lengthy’ negotiations between the VQ and the RCMP with protest organization representatives on the basis of protestors not coming to the fence (VQ interview). It was also agreed that there would be three (activity classified rather than strict geographically demarcated) zones of police response: Green (for festival-like protest), Yellow (entailing ‘controlled’ civil unrest), and Red (for criminal actions) (Chang et al., 2001:13; SQ and VQ interviews). In the event, the union march kept to its agreement not to approach the perimeter fence and was policed on a ‘low-profile, soft-hat’ basis (VQ interview). However, the fence was breached on the first day of the summit (20th April) following a separate demonstration, and on the second day, in one incident 12 Molotov cocktails (petrol bombs) were thrown at one RCMP Tactical Troop (a squad of 32 riot police) over a three-hour period (Killam, 2001:32).2

Police riot units initially displayed a ‘siege mentality’ (i.e. defending the wall per se), but following the breach, additional RCMP Tactical Troops were dispatched from Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario, and from the second day there were more mobile incursions outside the security perimeter (RCMP interview). In additional to sniper units (Information, 2001:20), police weaponry included water cannons (used by the SQ), tasers (stun-guns), pepper-spray (RCMP), individual irritant aerosols and plastic bullets fired from the ARWEN 37mm gun. A total of 5,148 tear gas canisters were discharged and 903 plastic bullets were fired (RCMP, SQ and VQ interviews; Killam, 2001:32, Ouellette, 2001:4). Despite the agreed tactical policy prohibiting use of the ‘sock round’ (lead-shot ball), some were fired ‘in the heat of the moment’ without permit, ‘although not by officers from this force’ (SQ interview). There were approximately 463 arrests (Killam, 2001:31).

Eyewitness accounts of the event vary, highlighting the contrasting nature of the protest and policing form. For example, one volunteer street medic recounts that:

Another medic treated a man whose finger was ripped off as he tried to scale the Wall of Shame [perimeter fence] .... One girl’s shoulder was dislocated. I treated a man who got hit in the back with a tear gas canister. Another man was hit in his Adam’s apple with a rubber bullet and had to undergo an emergency tracheotomy. Leigh experienced a serious asthma attack from all the gas she inhaled. There were many victims of police beatings – serious injuries from being pummelled by their batons. One man had his earring ripped straight out of his ear by a riot police officer (Ahronheim, 2001).

Whereas, other notes that:

the scene was a combination of carnival and chaos. Amid a cloud of tear gas, protesters trying to breach the perimeter lobbed bricks and pipes at police. Nearby, young female activists tied bras to the fence to protest the impact of free trade on poor women, while a group of demonstrators with painted mouths chanted and instructed activists how to interact with the media. A mile away, men dressed as clowns – to mock world leaders – sang peace songs .... (Kurlantzick, 2001; Ouellette, 2001:4).

One demonstrator reflected that ‘Breaching the wall was certainly a symbolic victory. but, in reality, we must keep in mind that we are no longer able to have our voices heard by delegates and no longer capable of blocking their meetings’ (de Grosbois, 2001:42), and indeed on this basis our police interviewees agreed that the policing operation had been a success: ‘The policing of the summit was successful and the fence gave the police a psychological advantage. The protesters had

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1 For public order duties the RCMP have Tactical Troops (and an armed back-up Emergency Response Team), whereas the Ontario Provincial Police (referred to later) have a Public Order Unit, in which officers carry side-arms (plus an armed back-up Tactical Team). The Ottawa Police Service (again, referred to later) had a Public Order Unit (on the same basis as OPP) at the time of the June 2002 G8 Summit, but this has now changed its name to the Emergency Services Unit.

2 The Quebec City event was the first time that petrol bombs had been used by demonstrators in Canada (SQ interview).
the goal to breach the fence rather than threatening diplomats or commercial premises; ‘There was little damage and the policing operation kept within its pre-planned budget’; ‘To some extent it was good that the fence was breached, in that this provided the demonstrator focus on that location’. However, wider consequences of the policing tactics could be questioned concerning the impact on the local and indeed protest communities of such stand-off policing involving ‘blanket’ force as displayed by the number of tear gas canisters fired. This would also seem to be a primary concern in the less overtly confrontational policing approach adopted for the protests that we focus on below occurring away from the Kananaskis G8 summit site.

G8 Summit, Kananaskis - 26-27 June 2002

The lead-in time for establishing policing arrangements for the G8 Summit was considerably shorter than that for the Quebec City event. The general expectation had been that this would take place in Ottawa, however, following the G8 Summit in Genoa in September 2001, the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that the June 2002 G8 Summit would be held in the remote rocky mountain village of Kananaskis, Alberta, 90km west of Calgary (CNN, 2002; Allen, 2003; Bergman, 2002a). Further, whilst the (re-)location to Kananaskis meant an effective removal of the expected primary protest target, it created a number of potential symbolic sites of protest across Canada. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on the policing of protest in two of these, namely Calgary (the closest city to the Summit site) and Ottawa (the capital), in addition to the policing arrangements for Kananaskis itself.

Kananaskis and Calgary

Given the geographical spread and the number of police and security agencies involved, the policing task was rather more complex than for the Quebec City Summit of the Americas. In both cases though, the RCMP had the same mandate concerning Internationally Protected Persons (IPPs) and as the federal police force; in the Kananaskis case though it was also the contracted-in provincial police. The Calgary Police Service (CPS) retained its usual policing tasks within Calgary, including responsibility for public order policing. Within the Kananaskis security perimeter, the Department of Defense played a security ‘assistance role’ to the RCMP in respect of logistics and ground and air support (McCutcheon, 2002: 16). Further, the policing operation generally involved additional personnel from a number of different forces, including officers from Edmonton, Saskatoon, Vancouver and Ontario (interview: CPS G8 Command Team officer; Bergman, 2002b). Again similar to Quebec City, a major policing task was to ensure an undisrupted Summit. However, whilst to this end the Quebec City Summit focused primarily on the protestor threat with the threat from terrorism being present but rather in the background (RCMP interview), given the post 9/11 context, Kananaskis superseded Quebec City as the largest security operation undertaken in peacetime Canada (Bergman, 2002b).

The equivalent of Quebec City’s perimeter wall was, for Kananaskis, a series of exclusion zones. On the ground, there were 3 coloured zones, with red constituting the approximate 2km radius Summit site core including the Summit hotel and public mountain trail. As mentioned, the military undertook an additional support role to the police, whereas the RCMP had responsibility for buildings, Prime Minister and IPP security. The next ‘blue’ zone was a 6½ km security boundary radius, patrolled by the military, and the third ‘yellow’ zone was of an approximately 20 km radius policed by RCMP with additional military support, incorporating Hwy 40 and Hwy 1 and starting on Stoney Nation reserve land. Additionally, there were a number of road closures and checks between Kananaskis country and Calgary (interview: CPS G8 National and International Intelligence Partners Liaison Officer). Indeed, the Canadian Prime Minister was reported as having joked with Italian journalists that the site was protected ‘from the back by mountains, from the front by a river, from the south by an Indian village and from the north by 500 [grizzly] bears’. Further, there was a 150 km no-fly zone established over the site (Bergman, 2002b).

In contrast to the exclusionary and overtly coercive form of ‘policing’ at Kananaskis, the policing operation in Calgary was on the basis of a decided ‘soft hat’ strategic policy, strongly resting

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1 This was attended by the political heads of the Group of Eight states, namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and US, in addition to the head of the EU presidency state (at that time Spain), the President of the European Commission, the UN Secretary General and a number of heads of state from Africa. The Kananaskis agenda included issues relation to terrorism, economic development and an Africa action plan (McCutcheon, 2002; G8 Summit Site, 2002; CNN, 2002).
The G8 protest in Ottawa, which was policed to similar effect. However, we now examine the location thereby reducing the number of otherwise potential on-site protestors, was questioned by our interviewees, and this is something we explore further later. However, we now examine the extent to which this was due to the changed policing strategy and tactics.

Command Team officer; demonstrators barricaded lunch-time customers at downtown McDonalds (interview: CPS G8 public order unit was deployed in only one incident when, on the first day of the Summit, about 30 protesters; on day two there was a 150-strong ‘mud people’ snake march (Pony Express, 2002: 15). Other protest events were peaceful and ‘celebratory’: again on day one involving an approximately 1,000-strong protestor ‘snake march’ through the downtown area, and an afternoon ‘protest picnic’ attended by ‘several hundred’ protesters; on day two there was a 150-strong ‘mud people’ snake march (Pony Express, 2002: 15).

The first line of response, however, was a low-profile Mountain Bike Unit, organized into cells and used for field-intelligence, but also trained in bike tactical operations (interview: CPS G8 Mountain Bike Unit officer) and an RCMP field dog team (which were not deployed), line munitions, CS gas, a mounted unit (interview: CPS G8 Public Order Unit officer) and an RCMP field dog team (Pony Express, 2002: 16). The first line of response, however, was a low-profile Mountain Bike Unit, organized into cells and used for field-intelligence, but also trained in bike tactical operations (interview: CPS G8 Mountain Bike Unit officer).

In the event, the number of protesters never exceeded 2,500 (Pony Express, 2002: 15) and the public order unit was deployed in only one incident when, on the first day of the Summit, about 30 demonstrators barricaded-in lunch-time customers at downtown McDonalds (interview: CPS G8 Command Team officer; Pony Express, 2002: 15). Other protest events were peaceful and ‘celebratory’: again on day one involving an approximately 1,000-strong protestor ‘snake march’ through the downtown area, and an afternoon ‘protest picnic’ attended by ‘several hundred’ protesters; on day two there was a 150-strong ‘mud people’ snake march (Pony Express, 2002: 15).

The Kânansk'as perimeter zone, protest was similarly low-key. On day one, approximately 200 protesters formed a convoy towards the conference site, but were stopped at the first checkpoint on Hwy 40; a bus with over 30 postal employees delivering 400 protest letters addressed to the G8 leaders reached the third checkpoint, and one demonstrator was arrested for obstruction. On day two, about 50 demonstrators ‘attempted to breach’ the security perimeter and one person was arrested (Pony Express, 2002: 14). This clearly stands in marked contrast to the policing – protestor dynamics in Quebec City. As one RCMP G8 Commander stated: ‘We had a number of goals going into this and one was to reduce the level of violence. During the event, we didn’t have to use any chemical weapons and we didn’t have one broken window in Calgary’ (Pony Express, 2002: 16). The extent to which this was due to the changed policing strategy and tactics per se, or the remoteness of the location thereby reducing the number of otherwise potential on-site protestors, was questioned by our interviewees, though, and this is something we explore further later. However, we now examine the G8 protest in Ottawa, which was policed to similar effect.
Ottawa

Unlike its primary role in policing the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, in Ottawa the protection of IPPs was not seen as an issue by the RCMP, but rather that of the protection of Parliament and other federal institutions and buildings, as well as foreign embassies, in addition to supporting the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) (RCMP, 2002: 3; RCMP interviews). For their part, the primary role of the OPS was to ensure a safe and orderly G8 protest event; protection of property and persons, and maintenance of individual rights and safety (OPS, 2002d: 4). To this end, the OPS operational plan specifically stipulated that:

Public order units will not be deployed or visible to protest groups unless directed to do so by Incident command. The Ottawa Police Service will maintain a ‘soft hat’ approach to crowd management. The deployment of public order will be directly related to the actions of the crowd (OPS, 2002d: 7).

Further, there was a policy that no exclusionary barriers were to be erected (OPS interview), although there was a 24-hour RCMP presence at Parliament Hill (RCMP interview).

Similar to the previous events, a number of police forces and agencies were involved in the operation. The immediate policing arrangements engaged the RCMP (in its capacity as the federal force) and the OPS (as municipal force), but the OPP (as provincial force) were also involved in pre-event training, and the number of forces increased with the intensity of the perceived protest ‘threat’, eventually amounting to 8 different forces (1 federal, 1 provincial and 6 municipal), plus SQ officers being sworn-in as Special constables (OPS and SQ interviews). Further, RCMP officers were recalled from Kananaskis (RCMP interviews). The agencies included the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Canadian Citizenship and Immigration, the Canadian Department of National Defense and the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency (Allen, 2003: 50-51, RCMP interview).

The ‘soft hat’ policing policy for the Ottawa G8 protest was underpinned by an integrated (joint RCMP and OPS) Major Event Liaison Team (MELT) operation, providing pre-, during and post-event police liaison and mediation for stakeholders and protest representatives, plus overt evidence gathering and surveillance, advance-notice ‘zero tolerance’ saturation regular uniform policing at expected gathering and protest sites, contingency plans for public order units/tactical troops on stand-by, and bike units providing real-time intelligence and ‘soft direction’ of crowds (OPS interviews). In the lead-up to the event, there were four ‘Open Lines’ (open discussion fora) meetings, organized and attended by members of MELT for businesses, residents and protest organizations (OPS interview). However, whilst discussions did take place with labour organizations, no contact was made with those from anti-globalization groups (NCR Integrated Police Team, 2002; OPS interview). Allen (2003: 50) argues that the former largely distanced themselves from the planned protest in Ottawa (in preference for Calgary) once it was felt that the Ottawa event was likely to involve violence.

This perceived change concerning the likely nature of the Ottawa protest came about four months prior to the G8 Summit when an umbrella protest group ‘Take the Capital’ published material on the www. and distributed leaflets and posters detailing two days of planned activities including ‘direct action’ against ‘banks, embassies, corporations, Canadian government institutions and economic development groups’ in Ottawa (CNN, 2002). According to protest leaflets and other webpages, these groups ranged from the Ottawa Committee of the World March of Women, calling for ‘revolutionary knitting protest’, to Ottawa Initiée par la Coordination anti-impérialiste, organizing a ‘march against the US Embassy in Ottawa’, to ‘Pink Bloc/Triangle Trash’ organizing a ‘march of 1000 flags of resistance’, to the Ontario Common Front Action’s G8 highway blockade planned for 25th June (Take the Capital, 2002; Ontario Common Front Action, 2002; http://ack.struggle.ca; http://www.takethecapital.net; http://indymedia.org/imc/ontario/torontoposter.jpg; http://geocities.com/g8bus). The perceived threat by the police was sufficiently high to not only, as mentioned earlier, redeploy RCMP officers from Kananaskis, but also to hold a joint training day directed by the OPS for all 9 forces involved, two months prior to the event (Ouellette, 2002: 12; OPS interviews).

In the event, the demonstrations and protest actions (including a ‘snake march’) were ‘without serious incident’; the public order units and tactical troops were never deployed; according to police estimates, the number of protesters at any one time never exceeded 4,000 and only 5 of these were arrested (Pony Express, 2002: 15; Allen, 2003: 55).

From our interviews with RCMP and OPS officers, four main reasons were put forward for the protest event passing peacefully. First, it was suggested that this was due to the weather; it was raining heavily on both days and this was regarded as having been a major deterrent to more
protesters attending. Secondly, it was seen as a successful policing operation, based on preplanning, intelligence, collaboration with other forces, information dissemination and ‘zero-tolerance’ policing, making it clear where the line was to be drawn and that any breach would involve swift arrest and a public order unit/tactical troop response. In particular, intelligence, evidence-gathering and surveillance were regarded as having played significant roles in that success, even to the extent that it had acted as a deterrent to larger numbers of protesters and ‘known activists’ attending. Thirdly, there had been an extremely high visible presence of police officers in ‘soft hat’ uniform, and finally, there had been no ‘spark’ to ignite the situation. Further, extra controls at the US border plus, it was felt, the new US anti-terrorism laws, may have had a negative impact on potential protesters from there due to concerns about being labelled as terrorists.

Four months prior to the event a JIG was established, composed of police and agency representatives mentioned earlier, as well as US agencies, which according to Allen (2003: 52) started a ‘vigorous program’ of intelligence-gathering, providing ‘information on persons, tactics and protestor planning’. Indeed, from information obtained by the JIG, not only were ‘protest leaders, especially those with policies of violence or violent records … identified and tracked’, but ‘all buses traveling to Ottawa for the protests were identified before they left their cities of origin. They were tracked en route … from a police helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft’. In turn these buses were met by MELT and all passengers ‘openly photographed’ (Allen, 2003: 51-52, 55; and by interview). It is important to stress here, however, that MELT are ‘excluded from Intelligence briefings’ (National Capital Region Integrated Police MELT, 2003), and that under the OPS ‘Agenda for Excellence for Major Events’ (2002b; 24) ‘the liaison mandate should be separate and independent from any intelligence gathering function’.

The Civil Liberties Association (CLA) of the National Capital Region, in a letter from its president to the OPS deputy chief (CLANC, 2002), also formally recognized the ‘greater effort’ on the part of the OPS to ‘protect legitimate dissent’ during its policing of the G8 protest event. The letter continues: ‘the approach of your force was the right one, and that by keeping the methods of dealing with potential violence out of sight (dogs, riot troops), you avoided a menacing appearance that can sometimes provoke demonstrators’. Further, with the exception of the policing of one during and related post-event incident, it expressed the Association’s ‘confidence and appreciation for the careful and conscientious way the Ottawa police responded to challenges of the G8 demonstrations’. This view was largely echoed by the Ottawa Witness Group of voluntary non-protestor observers in their report on the policing of the event (Witness Group, 2002). In this they state that ‘generally police interaction with marchers was professional. Police adhered to policy and used regular uniformed officers rather than riot police ….’, and noted that the MELT ‘proved to be a positive presence during G-8 events on June 22, 26 and 27 and defused some potentially difficult situations’. However, the report did express some concern regarding the lack of clearly displayed identity details by a number of officers, and the intrusive nature of police videotaping to the extent that it constituted ‘provocation and intimidation’ (Witness Group, 2002: unpaginated).

Wider context

In order to explain the public order policing developments that occurred within and between our two case-studies outlined above, we need to place both of these within the wider context of other events, and more particularly Commission of Inquiry reports pertaining to public order policing in Canada that were published in the same time-frame of these developments. Accordingly, we now briefly examine five critical ‘watersheds’ which occurred between 1997 and 2001 and discuss their repercussions in respect of lessons learned.

Saint-Sauveur and Saint-Simon – May 1997

A report by the Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (CPC) (2000) following its investigation into the RCMP’s policing of school-closure protests in Saint-Sauveur and Saint-Simon, New Brunswick, in May 1997 made a number of critical recommendations for RCMP public order policing policy and practice change. These in turn were accepted by the RCMP Commissioner (RCPM, 2001a; CPC, 2001a) and incorporated into RCMP policies and guidelines. Some of the

1 In its response to the Ottawa Witness Group report, the OPS noted that ‘... The Police Services Act and Regulations (Ontario) do not make the wearing of name tags mandatory and, as a result, some of the police services supporting the G8 security in Ottawa [excluding OPS public order unit officers] were not outfitted with these identifiers’ (OPS, 2002e).
recommendations related to the importance of police policies contained in the RCMP’s ‘Tactical Options Manual’ being carried through into policing on the ground, and in particular the need to attempt an ‘open dialogue’ with demonstrator leaders, and also to warn demonstrators to disperse prior to the deployment of tactical troops (in the Saint-Sauveur event there was no police loudhailer) (CPC, 2000: R1, 167; R15, 174). Other recommendations pointed to the need for the development of training programmes, and especially a Tactical Commanders course (to that date, there was no standard course for Commanders) (CPC, 2000: R4, 169). The report also stated, again with regard to Saint-Sauveur, that ‘special units’ should only be deployed as a last resort: ‘….. the situation was far from resembling a riot …. [it] justified deployment of the soft hats …. There was no reason to deploy the Tactical Troop, the Emergency Response Team or the Police Service Dog Team’ (CPC, 2000: 169). The recommendations, relevant for later events to which we refer, also included that police dogs should only be used as defensive rather than offensive weapons during a demonstration or riot and in this respect should only in ‘exceptional circumstances … be in direct contact with demonstrators’ (CPC, 2000: R6, 170); and that all tactical troop officers wear ‘distinctive means of identification’ (CPC, 2000: R16, 174). Further, again relevant for our examination of more recent events, it was recommended that officers engage in post-event community dialogue (CPC, 2000: R3, 168). The report also had a major impact in respect of RCMP event-reporting by insisting on a ‘paper-trail’ of incident records and of the tactical deployment of weaponry, specifically tear gas and dogs (CPC, 2000: R28, 178; R31, 179).

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Vancouver - 16-25 November 1997

The CPC Inquiry regarding the RCMP’s policing of the APEC conference held in Vancouver during November 1997 (CPC, 2001b)¹ raised some similar concerns to that for Saint-Sauveur and Saint-Simon, but also wider issues pertaining to the federal government’s role in the determination of policing in events where the protection of IPPs is involved.

Both the RCMP (acting as federal and provincial police within British Columbia) and the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) (as municipal force) were responsible for the policing of the conference. However, the RCMP had a specific mandate for the IPPs from 18 countries attending the conference and ‘held overall responsibility for security’ (CPC, 2001b: 15). Further, the RCMP were the sole force in command of the policing arrangements for the final day of the conference at a University of British Columbia (UBC) campus site (CPC, 2001b: 15-16), which we specifically focus on here.

It was publicly announced 11 months earlier² that the 5th APEC conference would take place in Vancouver, and indeed there had been nearly a 2-year pre-planning process for the event (CPC, 2001b: 24). Despite this, a contingency plan for dealing with likely protest difficulties occurring at the UBC-campus site was only called for two weeks before that event (CPC, 2001b: 437), and a 170-plus Quick Response Team (QRT) comprising of RCMP and VPD uniformed police and VPD bike squads was formed just one week prior to the event. QRT members only received ‘a few hours instruction on matters such as crowd control ….’ and were ‘never trained together’ (CPC, 2001b: 375-6).

Whilst protest against the conference passed relatively peacefully at various sites in Vancouver in the period up to the final day, the Threat Assessment Group had informed the RCMP that a core group of protesters (and particularly a group known as ‘APEC Alert’) were likely to engage in ‘civil disobedience, vigorous non-violent, protest action’ (CPC, 2001b: 112). However, the CPC Inquiry felt that such intelligence had not been matched by police pre-planning. There was a weakly constructed perimeter fence around the final meeting venue for the 75 IPPs (including, contentiously, President Suharto of Indonesia) at the UBC-campus site, which was not guarded by police, and there was no exit plan were the three exit routes from the site blocked by protesters (as indeed they were to be) (CPC, 2001b: 118-120, 126, 299).

The CPC Inquiry concluded that the policing operation displayed significant deficiencies in the Command and Control structure, both in respect of continuity from the pre-planning to the operational stage, but also on the ground (CPC, 2001b: R.31.1.2-31.1.3:444). At one stage the perimeter fence was breached due to lack of police presence (CPC, 2001b: 108); at another now notorious incident relayed across Canada’s news-media network, peaceful and retreating demonstrators and bystanders were sprayed with OC gas (pepper spray) – including a Canadian

¹ This was the second Inquiry panel into these events, chaired by Justice Ted Hughes. The first Inquiry panel was chaired by Gerald Morin, Q.C., plus two other panel members. Following accusations of bias and a dispute with the chair of the CPC, Shirley Healey, concerning alleged encroachment ‘upon the decision-making role of the panel to the point that the panel’s independence had been totally compromised’ (Morin, 2000: 161) Morin resigned, as did in turn the other two panel members.

² i.e. on 8 January 1997 (Pue, 2000: xii).
Broadcasting Corporation news cameraman filming the event! Like the Saint-Sauveur and Saint-Simon Inquiry report, the APEC Inquiry recommended that following a warning of police action being given to protesters, they ‘should be given a reasonable opportunity to comply before the police take further steps’ (CPC, 2001b: R.31.1.10:446). In the event, demonstrators blocking an exit road on the site were given no time between the warning and the firing of an OC canister. Further, the Inquiry found that in respect of this incident, ‘pepper spray was not required to move the protesters. It should not have been used’ (CPC, 2001b: 352). Also similar to the Saint-Sauveur and Saint-Simon Inquiry, it recommended ‘a comprehensive training program for Commanders’ (CPC, 2001b: R.31.1.4:444).

Another concern of the Inquiry similar to that for Saint-Sauveur and Saint-Simon was record-keeping; it not only recommending that a record be kept of the policing of the event, including all operational plans, but that this be held centrally and used as a basis for lessons learned, so as not to ‘reinvent the wheel on each and every occasion’ (CPC, 2001b: R.31.1.8:445). This is an especially significant recommendation for the purpose of developing a formalized police knowledge and foresight and, as we discuss shortly, was incorporated into an RCMP review of public order policing.

The Inquiry also found that in one incident at the UBC-campus, police conduct was ‘improperly …. Directly attributable to the actions of the federal government …. acting through the Prime Minister’s Office’ (CPC, 2001b: 99-100). Accordingly, the Inquiry report asserted that whilst there may be ‘room for a consultative process on such matters, ultimate responsibility must rest exclusively with the RCMP … and that they are to broke no intrusion or interference whatever from government officials (CPC, 2001b: R.31.3.2:448). Given the overtly coercive and exclusionary nature of the policing operation, also entailing the pre-emptive pre-event arrest of a number of perceived ‘troublemakers’ or ring-leaders, and intensified through federal government involvement and the presence of external security services, Ericson and Doyle (1999) have suggested that such events, where the IPPs policing mandate is concerned, constitute a ‘distinctive’ public order policing category.¹ Such a proposition is clearly apposite and we revisit this in our concluding discussion.

In his response to the Inquiry report, the RCMP Commissioner accepted the main findings and recommendations:

Mr. Hughes [the Inquiry chair] identified errors that were made at APEC, particularly in the areas of command structures, role separation, policy and planning, training, legal support, record keeping, and overall preparedness. I accept those findings (CPC, 2002: Appendix B).

Indeed, the RCMP Commissioner also indicated that since the event a major review of public order policing had been conducted, including ‘initiating ongoing consultations with other police agencies, nationally and internationally, to share information and to identify best practices in the provision of security at major public order events’ (CPC, 2002: Appendix B). To this end, in May 2001 the RCMP established a Public Order Unit as part of its Critical Incident Program (RCMP, 2001b). Further, with particular relevance to the later formalization of existing practices with the establishment of MELT (discussed earlier), the Inquiry report suggested that:

The RCMP should continue to follow, and enhance where appropriate, its existing open door policy of meeting with the leadership of protest groups, well in advance of a planned public order event, with a view to both police and protesters achieving their objectives in an environment that avoids unnecessary confrontation (CPC, 2001b: R.31.1.9:445).

In his response the RCMP Commissioner stated that ‘Since APEC, we have increased our efforts in this area …. for example, trained negotiators were utilised to assist in opening dialogue between police and protest leaders … in two recent events …. which avoided conflict’ (CPC, 2002: Appendix B). Finally, also concerning the issue of de-escalation of potential conflict, the CPC report stressed the importance of providing a ‘generous opportunity … for peaceful protesters to see and be seen in their protest activities by guests to the event’ (CPC, 2001b: R.31.1.1:443).

Organization of American States Summit, Windsor, Ontario – 4-6 June 2000

In the wake of large-scale protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle in December 1999 and the International Monetary Fund/World Bank congress in Washington in April 2000, an Organization of American States (OAS) summit was held in Windsor, Ontario, in June 2000. This was also seen by the police as a precursor to the policing of the Quebec City event.

Given the extent to which it was felt that the Seattle policing operation was disorganized and that protesters were able to disrupt the WTO meeting and, in contrast, the policing of the Washington

¹ This distinction is also supported by Hall and de Lint’s research into the policing of labour disputes in Canada (Hall & de Lint, 2003).
event was more effective given the construction of a ‘barricade perimeter’, those policing the Windsor event decided for the construction of an exclusionary fence too (Killam, 2001: 25-26; RCMP, SQ and VQ interviews). This decision was also taken in view of police intelligence that between 20-30,000 protesters were likely to attend Windsor. Accordingly, the six-block area of the summit site was cordoned-off by interlinked concrete highway median dividers on which was mounted an eight-foot continuous-sheet (as opposed to APEC’s separate) chain-link fencing. The policing operation involved 2,800 officers from the RCMP, the OPP and the Windsor Police (as the municipal force) who had undertaken 2-days of joint training. Similar to Quebec City, some tactical troops/public order units were deployed within the fence and others outside (Killam, 2001: 24-26, 46).

The number of protesters attending was considerably smaller than expected; estimates vary between 6,000 – over 2,000 (Killam, 2001: 26; Lord and Franssen, 2000; NUPGE, 2000). Many of these were from labour organizations with a similar contention to those at the summit of the Americas, namely protesting against a proposed FTAA agreement between the 34 OAS members, and the Canadian Auto Workers were part of the protest-rally organization team and provided crowd control marshals (Klein, et al., 2000; Lord and Franssen, 2000). The policing operation and perimeter fence model was generally regarded as a success by the police (RCMP and SQ interviews); there were only three incidents in which tactical troops and pepper spray were deployed, and only 78 arrests made (Killam, 2001: 26-27) compared with 525 and 1,300 arrests in Seattle and Washington respectively (NUPGE, 2000).

Killam (2001: 28) argues that three ‘key strategies’ building on Seattle and Washington were employed to make the policing of the event successful: partnership between the police forces involved; intelligence-led policing, and the venue enabling an exclusionary perimeter. From his interviews of police officers involved in the Windsor event, however, there were lessons to be learned, namely a longer period of joint training; standardization of communications equipment; the need for evidence-gathering team back-up for tactical units and, a common theme in our above case-studies, an enhanced command and control structure clearly making visible the line of command (Killam, 2001: 47-48). One could also question the differential between the number of protesters likely to gather in Windsor according to police intelligence and the actual numbers on the ground. The pull between the escalatory fears of the wider securitization picture and the local reality in respect of intelligence analysis is something that we pointed to concerning the policing of Kananaskis, and is also relevant for the following.

World Petroleum Congress, Calgary – 11-15 June 2000

A major determinant of the saturation ‘soft hat’ with contingency planning policing model, involving pre-event intelligence gathering plus bike team real-time surveillance and tactical operations, used by the CPS for the Calgary anti-G8 protests, was their involvement in the policing of the World Petroleum Congress (WPC) in Calgary one week after Windsor (CPS interviews).

The WPC was attended by about 3,000 delegates from 87 countries (CBC News, 2000a) and, similar to Windsor, an area of six square blocks was walled off with six-foot high metal fencing. The event was policed without major incident by the RCMP, CPS and Edmonton (municipal) Police, with the CPS in a general policing policy decision-making role. A Protest-Liaison Team was established in the 6-month lead-up to the WPC event; a JIG was also established, and an Incident Management Team, initially formed for the 1988 Calgary Olympics, was reinstated for the WPC (CPS interviews). Initial police intelligence estimates were that about 2,000 protesters would be present, and in the event there were between 1,000-2,000 (CBC News, 2000a; Risingtide, 2000). A number of local groups, through the ‘End of Oil Action Coalition’, and labour unions were involved in organizing the protest, which included a ‘counter-conference’ held at Calgary University; a Rally for Oil Accountability and Responsibility, and a ‘direct action day’ on which only about 200 protesters attended (Risingtide, 2000); a ‘snake march’ and generally a carnivalesque air with ‘colourful banners, puppets, masks and costumes’ (Mahoney, 2000).

There were concerns about the escalatory tone of much of the news media, and they were criticized for this by both police and demonstrator organizations (CPS interview; Mahoney, 2000). The latter stressed that it was important for this to be a peaceful protest in order to ‘get across the message of exploitation by oil companies’ (CBC News, 2000b).

G-20/IMF and World Bank, Ottawa – 16-18 November 2001

In the same way that the policing of Windsor impacted on Quebec City, and the WPC on Calgary G8, so too did the policing of the Ottawa G20 have a major role in the way that the Ottawa G8
was policed. For the first two examples, however, that impact largely meant the refinement and transfer of model from one to the other, whereas for Ottawa that meant a comprehensive review of public order policing.

The IMF/World Bank meetings were to be held in Washington on 28-29 September 2001, but were postponed following the 11 September terrorist attacks on the US, whereas the G20 Finance Ministers conference was originally planned to take place in New Delhi, but due to India’s relatively close geographical proximity to Afghanistan was transferred (CBC News, 2001a). Only four weeks notice was given that these would be held in Ottawa between 16-18 November 2001, and contingency planning for the event had to ‘factor in’ the ‘potential threat of terrorist actions’ (OPS, 2002a). The RCMP followed its IPP mandate, whereas the OPS took the lead in respect of public order, with officers from the OPP and Metropolitan Toronto Police in support. Indeed, in his Interim Report to the Ottawa Police Services Board following the G20 events, the OPS Chief states that ‘considerable effort was required to harmonize the role of the public order unit officers’ from the various forces (OPS, 2002a).

Up to 5,000 demonstrators were expect in Ottawa, whilst only about 2,000 attended (CBC News, 2001b), including members of Global Democracy Ottawa, the Ontario Coalition Against Tories, CLAC, Black Bloc anarchist movement and labour unions (Campbell, D. and Shahin, M., 2002; CPPC, 2002: 3; Starhawk, 2001). There was only one incident of property damage during a ‘snake march’ when a window of McDonalds restaurant was smashed (CPPC, 2002: ii). Generally, it was felt by those protesting that the event was policed heavy-handedly and out of proportion to the largely peaceful nature of the protest when the police were not intervening (CPPC, 2002: 4). Indeed, following the event, a Citizens Panel on Policing and the Community (CPPC) was formed (later to become the Ottawa Witness Group) which made a formal request to the (citizen oversight) Ottawa Police Services Board for an Inquiry into the way it had been policed. This was denied and in turn the CPPC held its own Review (CPPC, 2002: 2). There were issues of the police use of pre-emptive snatch squads and arrests, tear gas, rubber bullets, pepper spray, the immediate ‘hard hat’ deployment, and the display of machine guns (CPPC, 2002: 9). Of particular concern though was the (televised) use of police dogs against the crowd, indeed one CBC Radio news reporter not only stated to the Review that he was hit by an officer despite identifying himself as a reporter, but he was also bitten by a police dog (CBC News, 2001b). One demonstrator, giving evidence to the Citizens Review, stated (and we quote this at length as an example of the alleged confrontational mood during the arrest of two youths in the crowd):

The police were pushing the crowd around and the dogs were noticeably agitated. I positioned myself in front of riot officers who had a dog on a leash that was lunging at people. I informed the officer that this was a peaceful march and that he should move back. I felt is was a particularly dangerous situation as there were people with strollers and small children and grandparents on the march. The officer told me to move back, but I stood my ground as I felt the police were not acting with the people’s safety in mind. as I was talking to the officer I held my hands in the air to show that I was not making aggressive moves.

Suddenly the dog, which was on a leash, jumped at me and bit me in the thigh. After a few seconds it let go. People who had been in the crowd were shocked and asked the officer what he was going to do. He just replied that we should move away. The dog continued to lunge at people and within a minute the dog attacked a woman, grabbing her sweater. Fortunately she was able to get away. At this time I was facing away from the crowd, trying to force myself in between the protesters and the dog, but occasionally I got a glimpse of the actions of the other officers. They were acting very aggressively, pointing guns at people and pushing others with their shields (CPPC, 2002: 6).

Further, there were complaints concerning not only the lack of police identification, but also the negative impact this had on the possibility of liaison or communication. In this respect two other demonstrators stated to the Review that:

The police were anonymous. They wore no badges or numbers that would identify individual officers.

... at no point were there identifiable command officers who were in charge of the police to communicate with during the march. There was no one in charge on the street that march leaders could communicate with to attempt to defuse tense situations (CPPC, 2002: 4).

To this extent, the policing operation on the ground appears somewhat out of step with its pre-planning an initial communicative approach. In the lead-up stage to the event the RCMP had arranged for a conflict resolution mini-seminar to be led by academics from Saint Paul’s University,
Ottawa, attended by 26 participants, including government officials, police agencies, NGOs and protest group spokespersons (Makhoul, 2002), and later there were also separate discussions between the OPS and protester representatives. Further, the perimeter fencing around the G20 site, unlike that in Quebec City, was only waist high (CBC News, 2001b). Whilst the OPS Interim Report (mentioned earlier) refers to the fine line between ‘balancing the rights of activists and freedom of expression under the [Canadian] Charter of Rights and Freedoms with the security requirements of host agencies’, and that the ‘police responded to the threat by deploying lawful tactics whose purpose and context may have been misunderstood by persons present’ (OPS, 2002a), clearly there was some recognition on the part of the OPS that there was room for improvement. Indeed, not only does the Interim Report continue: ‘As there will be future meetings in Ottawa, there is a clear need to enter into discussions with demonstrators in an attempt to develop a protocol which would help guide police action and inform protest groups’ (OPS, 2002a), and at a meeting with the Ottawa Police Services Board one week after the event, the OPS Chief stated that ‘this is not to suggest, for a moment, that we cannot learn from our experience with the G-20 meeting’ (OPS, 2001). In this respect, the Interim Report refers to a number of recommendations following an internal operation review, namely concerning communications technology, enhanced training, command and control and community dialogue (OPS, 2002a).

‘Agenda for Excellence’

The outcomes of the criticisms received post the G20 event, the Citizens Panel recommendations and the OPS internal operations review resulted in an ‘Agenda for Excellence for Policing Major Events’ (OPS, 2002b) on the part of the OPS, formally promoting consultation, recognition of the right to protest and the MELT (OPS, 2002c; OPS interviews). Similar to McPhail et al’s (1998) characteristics of ‘negotiated management’, the document stresses three ‘key objectives’, namely:

1. to uphold the democratic rights of all individuals to freedom of opinion, expression, association and assembly as guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
2. to strengthen community partnerships through communication, consultation, collaboration and transparency in planning and operations;
3. to ensure the safety and security of our community and our members (OPS, 2002b:2, original emphasis).

An essential part of the major event policing strategy is that of ‘crowd management’, involving early planning and input from stakeholders, including ‘direct dialogue with protest organizers’, plus recognition of ‘the potential for escalation through the use … and presence … of specific strategies and tactics’, including dogs, tactical units and ‘technical aids’ (2002b: 3). Further, addressing the police-dog unit concerns raised during the G20 event, the document states that ‘these units are not [to be] used in a manner that will place handler and dog within a crowd’ (OPS, 2002b: 7). Again like the negotiated management model, the ‘Agenda for Excellence’ also introduced an element of discretion in arrest-making during an event: ‘Decisions regarding arrests and search and seizure should be guided by statutory requirements as well as the overall objectives set out for Major Events policing. For example, the potential impact of an arrest on broader crowd dynamics should be kept in view’ (2002b: 6). Additionally, it highlights the need for during and post-event communication (2002b: 4) and, as part of this, a ‘reassertion’ of the ‘critical importance’ of major event liaison and the assignment of a senior OPS officer to operationalize this. Specifically, ‘at events, liaison officer(s) (ideally a team sized and equipped in relation to the scale of the event) should be onsite, easily accessible to event organizers and participants and clearly identified (e.g. vests)’ (OPS, 200b: 5), i.e. as formalized in the MELT.

Concluding discussion

We opened by referring to the debate concerning a trend in public order policing away from a primarily reactive, confrontational and dispersal-oriented model to one that is more directed towards crowd management. In this respect we discussed della Porta and Reiter’s (1998) position with regard to an increasingly accommodatory form of policing protest located in a general move towards liberal democracy within ‘Western’ societies, and likened this to some extent to Brewer et al’s (1996) policing – politics/state relation. McPhail et al. (1998) were also mentioned concerning a similar shift from an ‘escalated force’ to a ‘negotiated management’ model. As discussed, Johnston (2000), Reiner (1998)
and Wright (2002) identified a similar process, but located this within the movement from modern to advanced modern society.

However, in our two case-studies (i.e. Quebec City and Kananaskis per se, rather than the associated events in Calgary and Ottawa) plus the watershed events where IPPs were present, we do not find this to be the case. The policing of these events in both policy and practice was primarily overtly coercive and exclusionary. This would support Ericson and Doyle’s (1999) suggestion (with regard to the 1997 APEC summit) that the policing of such events constitute a special case. In contrast, our examination of those events where IPPs were not present, and especially the G8 symbolic protest sites of Calgary and Ottawa in our second case-study, does support the notion of a trend towards crowd management, and particularly so at the policy level. Throughout this article though, we have indicated a number of qualifications to the notions of negotiation and accommodation. First, as indeed recognized by della Porta and Reiter (1998), this process entails enhanced information gathering, and we argue here even more so with respect to the pre-event intelligence, infiltration, surveillance and pre-emptive arrest directed at those outside the institutionalized forum. Secondly, the visible contingency ‘soft hat’ policing would seem to be a more legitimatory and less overtly confrontational surface to the underlying process. Thirdly, the move towards pre-publicized intensive overt surveillance at these events is not only intimidatory but, according to our police interviewees, even a deterrent for some protesters from attending. These combined, move contemporary public order policing away from the former model of reactive protester dispersal, but also away from a practice of negotiation and accommodation, towards the ‘selective incapacitation’ of protest.

REFERENCES


1 A further example is the policing of protest against a World Trade Organisation meeting in Montreal in July 2003 where the police read the Riot Act and arrested more than 50% of the approximately 400 demonstrators (Edmonton Journal, 2003).

22. Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP (2001b) Commission Interim Report Following a Public Hearing into the Complaints Regarding the Events that Took Place in connection with Demonstrations During the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference in Vancouver, B.C. in November 1997 at the UBC Campus and Richmond Detachments of the RCMP, Ottawa: CPC.
Šiame dešimtmetyje vyksta nemanai svarbių diskusijų dėl „vakarų“ viešosios tvarkos palaikymo politikos ir praktikos nuo atsargingo reaktyviojo, konfrontacinio ir protestuotojo modelio įkė modelio, kuris yra labiau paremtas konfliktų rizikos mažinimo sąvoka, apimantą protinių sugebėjimų pastelkimą, abipus bendrivimą bei derybų metu priimtą susitarimą, t. y. įsimažinio „valdymo“ linke. Tokio pasikeitimo priežastys yra bendras judėjimas laisvės demokratines visuomenės link šiose valstybėse ir apskritai socialinio policijos pokyčių procesas, vykstantis dėl didėjančio judėjimo nuo modernios iki toliau pažengusios moderniosios visuomenės. Be to, priežastys, dėl kurių policija yra šiukšta į šiuos raidus pokyčius, yra susijusios su jos ir valstybės ryšiu, susirūpinimu dėl teisės veiksmų bei jos darbu visuomenėje, kur vis labiau susiduria su rizika. Vis dėlto pati policija ne tik lemia pokyčius reaguodama į šių spaudimą, bet ir veikia kaip faktorius, padedantis jai pačiai keistis turimų policijos žinių bei įgutos patirties pagrindu.

Nuo tvarkos palaikymo iki masių valdymo: tvarkos palaikymas antiglobalizacinių protestų mūsų visuomenėje Kanadoje

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SANTRAUKA

Šiame dešimtmetyje vyksta nemažai svarbių diskusijų dėl „vakarų“ viešosios tvarkos palaikymo politikos ir praktikos nuo atsargingo reaktyviojo, konfrontacinio ir protestuotojo modelio įkė modelio, kuris yra labiau paremtas konfliktų rizikos mažinimo sąvoka, apimantą protinių sugebėjimų pastelkimą, abipus bendrivimą bei derybų metu priimtą susitarimą, t. y. įsimažinio „valdymo“ linke. Tokio pasikeitimo priežastys yra bendras judėjimas laisvės demokratines visuomenės link šiose valstybėse ir apskritai socialinio policijos pokyčių procesas, vykstantis dėl didėjančio judėjimo nuo modernios iki toliau pažengusios moderniosios visuomenės. Be to, priežastys, dėl kurių policija yra šiukšta į šiuos raidus pokyčius, yra susijusios su jos ir valstybės ryšiu, susirūpinimu dėl teisės veiksmų bei jos darbu visuomenėje, kur vis labiau susiduria su rizika. Vis dėlto pati policija ne tik lemia pokyčius reaguodama į šių spaudimą, bet ir veikia kaip faktorius, padedantis jai pačiai keistis turimų policijos žinių bei įgutos patirties pagrindu.

Ligio šiol moksliniai tyrimai šiais klausimais daugiausia buvo atliekami labiau orientuojantis į Vakarų Europą ir Jungtines Valstijas negu į Kanadą, be to, labiau į viešąją tvarką nei į antiglobalizacijos protestus. Šis straipsnis kompensuoja šį stigminį; jame pateikiamos šios tyrimo metu darë rezultatai. Taigi šiame straipsnyje buvo įvertinamas ir haikas,- dėl padidėjusios terorizmo grėsmės po rugpjūčio 11-osios teroro aktos, yra buvo palyginami nekonfrontacinius, nes Kanadas yra visuomenės ir valstybės suspėjimas siekti ne nuolatinių veikimų ir įgyvendinti suvokiamą, „soft hat“ (tiesiogiai vertinamas „švelnusis kepurės“) politiką, taip pat į tarpininkų ryšių mažinimą. Remiantis šiais dviem tyrimais turėtų būti pažymimai, jog antiglobalizacijos protestų kontrolavimas Kanadoje pasikeitė nuo reaktyviojo į konfliktinio modelio įkė modelio, kuriamu daugiau dėmesio skiriama būsimai suvokiamas. Vis dėlto tam, kad būtų galima sukonkretinti šių kontrastų įvykius ir nuodugniai nustatyti tokio kontrolavimo pokyčius, šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjami penki Kanados viešosios tvarkos palaikymo 1997 ir 2001 m. atvejai.

Kaip pažymėta šiame straipsnyje, jis yra baigiamas remiant diskusijas dėl tendencijos pereiti nuo vieno modelio prie kitos, atsižvelgiant į formaliąją politiką, kartu įvairioje politinėje sferoje jësvarstomas tos politikos diegimo praktikojos mastas. Šiame straipsnyje taip pat nagrinėjama, kai kada minios valdymas gali būti apsvarstytas abiejų derybose dalyvaujančių dalyvių šaltų, nes įvairios antiglobalizacijos protestuotojų grupės išskiria už pagrindinio institucionalumo proceso ribų. Be to, nurodoma, jog protestų kontrolavimas, įskaitant tarptautinę masų saugumą, čia yra pagrindinė politinė formą ir diskurso politiką žymėdamos tokių protestų masų saugą. Be to, nurodoma, jog protestų kontrolavimas, įskaitant tarptautinę masų saugumą, čia yra pagrindinė politinė formą ir diskurso politiką žymėdamos tokių protestų masų saugą.