Migration of Ukrainians to Central European countries in the context of the Postmaidan internal and international crisis

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Abstract The article describes of changes in migration tendencies of Ukrainians to the EU and Central European societies, particularly after the Revolution of Dignity and the beginning of Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. It highlights the fact that, despite the emergence of the phenomenon of internally displaced persons, the main way in which Ukrainians reach Europe remains labour migration. Among factors that have influenced the movement of citizens have been the migration policy of Ukraine, the EU and Central European countries, which has become more positive rather than a critical attitude to refugees from the Middle East.

Key words: internally displaced persons, migration, Central Europe, Ukraine.

Raktiniai žodžiai: viduje perkelti asmenys, migracija, Vidurio Europa, Ukraina.

Introduction

Since the 19th century, Eastern Europe has provided a reservoir of human resources for Western European countries, except when these regions were separated by the “Iron Curtain” in the post-war period. The fall of this dividing line at the very end of the 1980s, liberalisation of the political regime and radical differences in citizens’ levels of welfare in different parts of the “old continent” became the impulse for migration from East to West. The specific features of this have been a “commuting” tendency, an environment with a temporary character, the formation of transnational networks and an adherence to the demands of a “black” market for labour.
Such tendencies are characteristic of Ukraine, where migration has formed one of the key historical and modern characteristics of development. At different times, the nature of migration has depended on a distinctive combination of factors, but political instability, the redistribution of territories among various states and the struggle for the majority of citizens to make a decent income in their homeland have remained the main influences. The latter reason was the most powerful argument for the departure and, after time, the return home for many Ukrainians. Seasonal migration (commuting) has had a significant influence on the population size and has made the forecast of dynamics even more difficult.

The Revolution of Dignity became a trigger for a hybrid war by Russia against Ukraine and provoked the emergence of the phenomenon of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Donbas and Crimea. A natural question arises about whether political turbulence in the country, international crisis, social and economic difficulties had a major influence on the change in characteristics of external migration. Particularly when taking into consideration the relative geographical, historical cultural, social and ideological proximity to Central European societies, it is necessary to determine how the war in eastern Ukraine influenced the perception of migrants from neighbouring countries, and the quantity dimension and behaviour patterns of Ukrainians in their environment.

Taking these conditions into consideration, the aim of our investigation is to define:

1) the quantity dimension of migration from Ukraine under the influence of the crisis of 2014-2016, particularly with regard to movement to Central European countries;
2) the motivations of modern Ukrainian migrants;
3) the nature of current and expected policy towards internally displaced citizens, who are potential migrants in Ukraine and, correspondingly, to neighbouring Central European countries;
4) factors that will influence the mobility of Ukrainians from both a short-term and long-term perspective.

**Methods**

For scientists who study migration from Ukraine between 1990 and 2010, the existence of a “commuting” tendency during this period predetermined a return to a constant place of living at least after every six months spent abroad. Most people who come from post-socialist countries do not regard a main aim of employment as being a move to a permanent place of residence, but rather a search for temporary sources of income greater than what they receive at home. Scientists call this model “incomplete migration”, or use it to determine the term “mobility” (Engbersen, Okólski, Black, Panţiru 2010, 9; Grzymała-Każłowska 2013, 5).
Someone who examines migration from Ukraine faces the same difficulties as researchers who study these problems in Central and Eastern Europe. For a start, the accumulation of statistical data is made difficult by factors such as a discrepancy in the statistical systems of Ukraine and Central European countries and fixation at the border – mainly with regard to crossing the border without definition of aims, and thus motivation. In EU countries, governmental organisations count only the number of people with a residence or labour permit. This does not allow for accurate data on the number of people who reside in a country on a permanent basis, nor on the purpose of their stay (for education, employment, business or private reasons). In the countries of departure only a small quantity of citizens officially record the fact of departure abroad by means of cancellation of registration (in case of Ukraine), having no stimulus to do it. Furthermore, official organisations have no motivation to include additional questions in fixation forms of statistical information, thus limiting the empirical basis for research (Soltész 2014). Statistical and other types of analysis of this phenomenon also complicate an assessment of the dominance of commuting (seasonal and temporal), border migration, and the limited level of fixation.

In Ukraine, administrative data that are intermediary for the analysis of migration trends are accumulated by the State Migration Service, the State Border Guard Service and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since April 4, 2016, all functions involving the cancellation of registration of citizens rests with local governments. The State Migration Service retains the functions of providing residence permits and registration of refugees.

The results of citizen questionnaires are more adapted to processing; another thing is that not many relevant ones have been conducted, or, as in the case of a census, they are outdated (the latter took place in 2001). Meanwhile, valuable information was provided by published results of household assessments with regard to citizen employment, the latest of which were carried out in 2008 and 2012, the data of the International Migration Organization (IMO), European Statute.

**Discussion**

The researchers emphasise the fact that in 1990 the rate of migration from Central, Southern and Eastern Europe to European Union countries was fairly low in comparison with previous expectations based on the neoclassical paradigm, which explains the movement of citizens by means of almost exceptional differences in levels of social and economic development. This paradox can be explained by means of the formation of barriers on the EU’s borders to prevent the mass arrival of new migrants. At the same time, this contributed to irregular migration of those originating from post-socialist countries (Engbersen, Okólski, Black, Panţiru 2010, 7-8).
Neoclassical theory, which explains migration flows firstly by means of economic factors, started to be perceived as instrumental for the study of this phenomenon in Ukraine. On the eve of the Revolution of Dignity, having analysed Ukrainians’ motivation for migration, the researchers put forward a thesis on the violation of civil and political rights and the strengthening of overall authoritarian tendencies as influencing this choice when considered with the background of a stagnant economic system (Borschevska 2014). It is suggested that human capital theory is used as a basis for this region, according to which a person’s social and demographic characteristics – their age, sex, civil status, education, skills, employment and social relationships – are important determinants for migration at a micro level. This is particularly the case for decision-making with regard to departure, the country chosen for migration and whether migration is on a “commuting” or regular basis. Familiarisation with the concept of cumulative causation is no less useful. According to this concept, migration develops as a stable phenomenon supported by the factors of networks, a culture of migration and the distribution of human capital (Kurekova 2011). Despite this fact, it can be considered that in recent years the migration of a great many Ukrainians to European countries gained the features of “fluid migration”: in other words, many citizens made an individual choice of going in search of “one’s place in the sun” abroad, taking advantage of opportunities for free employment. Weak ties with one’s native land and the country of stay are also characteristic features of “fluid migration” (Grzymała-Każłowska 2013, 5).

One negative stimulus for migration is corruption. In the case of Ukraine, this neo-institutional phenomenon is regarded as one that results in the loss of human resources and complicates the development of society on a regular basis (Lapshyna 2014). The complexity of research and the important role of social and cultural factors in the direction and character of migration are therefore determinative features of this phenomenon in Central Europe, including Ukraine. Similarly, the inefficiency of migration policy in European countries and the continent as a whole, and the absence of a strategic view on citizens’ mobility in the future are evident (Ruspini, Eade 2014, 6). This is particularly the case given the conditions of armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia, which is regarded as a crisis of European order.

Results

Migration tendencies of Ukrainians after the Revolution of Dignity

From 2013, when the inner crisis started to collapse (with the Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity events) and was followed by the external crisis (including the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of part of the Donbas region), reasons for migration started to include political instability, state weakness and the lack of
guarantees for citizens. Military-political factors such as threat to the lives, liberty and property of citizens have caused the migration of Ukrainian citizens who live in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (annexed in February to March 2014) and the eastern parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (the seizure of power structures by terrorists started in April, clashes with the military units of the armed forces of Ukraine in May, and the introduction of military units of the Russian Federation in August 2014).

These citizens are classified as internally displaced persons, for whom the General Assembly developed international standards of treatment in 1998. Such people are those who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in a bid to avoid the effects of armed conflict, violence, human rights violations or disasters, but have not abandoned the recognised borders of the state (IDMS Strategy 2015-2020, 2015).

As for June 6, 2016, some 1,026,177 people were relocated from temporarily occupied territory to other regions, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – 1,003,824 people, and 22,353 people from Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. This included 169,756 children and 493,897 elderly and physically challenged people. This constitutes the largest number of displaced people in Europe since the Second World War. The settlers mostly ended up in Luhansk, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odessa, Kharkiv, the Poltava region and Kiev – in other words, locations close to the areas of departure and the capital. Western regions that border Central European countries and are furthest away from southern and eastern Ukraine are still the areas of least attention for internal migrants. This indicates that immigrants still want to maintain contact with relatives who have remained in temporarily occupied territories and care of abandoned properties, so end up somewhere that allows them to quickly return. The number of forced migrants represents more than 3% of Ukraine (Нарадж 2015, 136).

By the start of 2016, the International Organization for Migration counted 668,000 migrants from Ukraine and classified 310,000 people as potential migrants. The top 10 destinations included the Russian Federation (204,900), Poland (141,000), the Czech Republic (102,900), Italy (76,300) and Belarus (22,500) (Godzimirski, Puka, Stormowska 2015).

It is important to mention that in 2012 to 2013 cases of searching political refugees were becoming frequent because of the policy of selective justice, which has the Viktor Yanukovych regime, but were not widespread. The Ukrainian crisis of the past two years, including the deployment of military operations in eastern Ukraine, and thus increased uncertainty in the future led to a significant increase in people seeking protection abroad. Among them were not only people from eastern Ukraine and Crimea, but also men who wanted to avoid mobilisation into the army.

According to data from Eurostat, during 2014 and the first half of 2015 a great number of Ukrainians sought shelter abroad, mostly in Russia (392,552 people),
Germany (5,300), Italy (4,775) and Poland (3,610) (Table 1). In comparison with 2013, the number of people seeking shelter from Ukraine in EU countries grew by a factor of 13, although this comprised only 2.2% of people among all similar cases of non-EU residents (main Ukrainian trends and figures on migration).

Table 1: Number of Ukrainian asylum seekers, 2014-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination country</th>
<th>Number of Ukrainian asylum seekers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>392,552*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>663**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
*Data for the EU member states is for 2014 and the first half of 2015, Eurostat1; data for the Russian Federation is for 2014 until 23.09.15, Federal Migration Service.
**Data from Belarus is for 2014.

Taking into account the growth in the number of people looking for protection, Ukrainians now occupy 13th position in the list of nationalities seeking refuge.
Another trend is the low rate of successful applications, with a refusal rate of 78% during 2014 and the first half of 2015. EU countries explain this position by means of the geographical limitations of the conflict territory and opportunities for internal migration for fugitives. Another reason is the enormous flow of migrants from Syria, Libya and Eritrea.

The most reliable way for Ukrainians to migrate is still for labour reasons. According to the results of a survey carried out by the IOM, there were approximately 688,000 labour migrants from Ukraine (432,800 long-term and 246,400 short-term migrant workers) during the second half of 2014 and first half of 2015. At the same time, aggregated figures from Eurostat indicate that 859,000 Ukrainians had work permits in 2014.

It should be noted that official Russian statistics indicate that most migrants from eastern Ukraine moved to Russia, but this information should be treated with care because of the possible exaggeration of numbers provided by this source. As already mentioned, according to data from the Federal Migration Service, for 1 July, 2015, some 35,000 Ukrainians applied for temporary refugee status, with another 209,000 having temporary residence rights, 113,000 joining the programme of voluntary resettlement for ethnic Russians, and 43,000 waiting to be granted permanent residence (Jaroszewicz, Strielkowski, Duchac 2014). This situation can be explained by the lack of necessary resources for migration to Europe, a low level of mobility, a lack of knowledge of languages, and the preservation of tight connections mainly between people in the Donbas region and Russians.

In general, the top five destination countries (the Russian Federation, Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy and Belarus) account for 80% of overall short-term and long-term migration flows from Ukraine (Міграція як чинник розвитку в Україні 2016).

In 2014, some 17,500 Ukrainians assumed citizenship in EU countries, putting them 15th by this metric in the EU (in total, almost 890,000 people assumed European citizenship). The highest proportion of Ukrainians gained citizenship in Germany (20.2%), compared with 18.9% in Portugal, 11.7% in Czech Republic and 10% in Poland.

This year, citizens of Ukraine also received the highest number of first residence permits in the EU (303,000), followed by citizens of the US (199,000), China (170,000), India (135,000) and Morocco (96,000). These five countries account for about 40% of all permits issued in the EU. Most Ukrainians received an employment-related permit, with Poland the main destination country (accounting for 81% of all permits in 2014) and the number rising by about 30% compared 2013.

According to data from the State Migration Service, between 2014 and 2016, Ukraine saw a trend towards an increase in the number of people who went abroad for permanent residence on the basis of permits – growing from 8,932 in 2014 to 11,345 in 2015. During the first decade of 2016, 2,604 such permits were issued,
showing that last year’s dynamics were at least preserved. Meanwhile, the number of people who returned to Ukraine decreased from 2,366 in 2014 to 1,687 in 2015 (Table 2).

Table 2: Number of permits to leave for citizens of Ukraine for permanent residence and citizens who returned from abroad (2014 to 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>First decade of 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of permits to leave for citizens of Ukraine for permanent residence</td>
<td>8,932</td>
<td>11,345</td>
<td>2,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of citizens who returned to Ukraine after a long stay abroad</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>1,687</td>
<td>1,687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is worth of noting that a smaller number of potential migrants legalise official permits to leave for permanent residence. They have other intentions, with the majority of Ukrainians who live abroad for a long period of time leaving on the basis of other documents and without legalisation of their intentions. Furthermore, statistics provided by Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy do not enable an estimate to be made of how many permits were given to citizens from the Donbas region.

It is also problematic to assess the quantitative traits of Ukrainian migration to V4 countries after the Revolution of Dignity, given the lack of official statistics. According to estimates from experts, there were about 240,000 employees in Poland from Ukraine in 2014, as well as 112,000 in the Czech Republic, 18,000 in Hungary and 16,000 in Slovakia. The total number of migrants in EU states from Ukraine was about 1.1 million, compared with about 386,000 in the V4 countries.

In 2015, Poland surpassed the Russian Federation in the number of residence permits issued to Ukrainians, at 30.4%. With regard to Hungary, that country is attractive mainly to Ukrainians of Hungarian origin, and Slovakia to residents of Ukraine’s Transcarpathian region.

As demonstrated by data from Eurostat, in 2015 citizens and/or natives of Ukraine comprised a sufficient or significant proportion of foreigners in V4 countries. The biggest communities of natives from Ukraine – 100,7 thousand, constituting 24.2% of the total number of foreigners – formed in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, these numbers were 42,000 and 8.8%, and in Slovakia 10,100 and 5.7%. A large discrepancy between the number of Ukrainian citizens and natives living in Hungary – 6,900 and 42,000, respectively – can be explained by the fact that many ethnic Hungarians have already been naturalised there.

As already stressed, the number of recognised asylum seekers in Poland was limited after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the conflict in Donbas. On July 1, 2016, there were 17 refugees from Ukraine in Poland. A further 229 peo-
people had the right to stay in the country for humanitarian reasons, 10 had so-called tolerated stay and 43 had additional security. The fact that 5,368 asylum seekers had registered since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict shows the low percentage of positive decisions on requests.

Nevertheless, Poland is the only EU country in which significant growth of Ukrainian migrants was observed after the start of armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia. This can be explained by the liberal conditions for obtaining a permit there for seasonal employment, the needs of the Polish market in the areas of agriculture and households, the homogeneity of the Ukrainian and Polish societies and communications facilities. A Polish paradox is evident, characterised by attempts to limit the inflow of asylum seekers even from eastern Ukraine and Crimea, and at the same time very liberal legislation on residence permits (Szczepanik, Tylec 2015). However, there has been a misunderstanding of the nature of Ukrainian migration even in the perception of Polish politicians, who, for example, claimed during European Parliament debates in January 2016 that Poland has accepted around 1 million refugees from Ukraine.

According to a study conducted by the Center for East European Studies at the end of 2013 to early 2014 the approximate number of Ukrainian migrants was 240,000. Some 45% of these were “commuters” who worked in Poland on a seasonal basis. There was a large increase (60%) in the number of working permits issued to Ukrainians (372,000); in the first half of 2015, this index showed 402,000 permits. In October 2015, the number of Ukrainians was 52,000, of which more than 21,000 had the right to permanent residency, while more than 28,000 permits were issued for temporary employment of up to six months (given that one person could get more than one permit, these numbers do not reflect the number of Ukrainians actually working in the country). Poland has thus surpassed Russia as a country for long-term migration, at 22.5% versus 19.2% (Jaroszewicz 2015). Between January and August 2016, government institutions of Poland decided positively on 34,852 permanent residence permits for Ukrainians, 416 long-term EU residence permits and 4,012 for permanent residence in Poland.

Many Poles confirm that the economy of their country relies on both skilled and unskilled Ukrainian workers. Despite the opportunities in the Polish labour market, the country’s citizens have a critical attitude towards migrants as they are, particularly with the background of the evolution of problems in France and Germany (Mulhall 2015). However, taking into account shortages in the workforce, the National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers in Poland suggests giving permanent residence permits to 1 million migrants, especially Ukrainians.

The Czech Republic has no border with Ukraine, but is among popular countries for Ukrainians and is a major destination for people living in the Transcarpathian region, especially taking into account sustainable development there and the diversification of the country’s economy, a lack in the population below working age
and a liberal migration policy caused by the factors mentioned above. At the end of September 2015, there were 461,880 foreigners living in the Czech Republic, equating to 4.4% of the entire population. Of these, 56% had the right to permanent residence and the other 44% temporary residence. Ukrainians form the largest migrant community in the Czech Republic:

That same September, 60 Ukrainians asked for international protection in the Czech Republic, equating to 48% of all asylum seekers. The Czech government accepted 47.3% of all applications. During 2014 Ukrainians gained the largest number of Czech citizenships, with 2,077 granted from the total of 4,915 applications received. Prague had recently adopted a programme for accelerated employment for those skilled in construction, information technology, planning, electrical engineering and the medical profession. By June 30, 2016, some 28,118 Ukrainians in the territory of the Czech Republic had temporary residence permits and 79,496 had long-term ones, showing how popular the country is as a destination.

In June 2016, a total of 87,966 foreigners had residence permits in Slovakia, representing about 1.6% of the country’s population. Among EU countries, Slovakia has the sixth-lowest proportion of foreigners. Ukrainians were the second-largest group (with 10,000 individuals, or an eighth of all foreigners), coming after Czechs that live in Slovakia on a legal basis (Migration in Slovakia 2015).

In just the first half of 2015, Slovakia issued Ukrainians in its territory with a total of 9,000 permits for temporary and permanent legal stays. By way of comparison, 7,000 were issued in the first half of 2014. 137 permits of the same kind. Residence permits in Slovakia were received by 2,855 citizens of Ukraine during the first half of 2015, compared with 1,039 in the previous year. This can be viewed as a consequence of the Ukrainian political crisis. As at the end of June 2016, there were 11,517 Ukrainians with residence permits living in Slovakia, thus comprising the country’s largest community of non-EU nationals.

The situation is the same with regard to the non-significant number of asylum seekers in Slovakia, comprising approximately 24 and 14 individuals in 2014 and 2015. Meanwhile, 2014 saw sizeable growth in the number of Ukrainians staying in Slovakia after the validity period of their visas expired, rising from 313 individuals in 2013 to 503 – which can be explained by the Ukrainian economic crisis (Benč 2015). It should be noted that Slovakia was less impacted by the 2015 and 2016 wave of refugees than other V4 countries: according to official data, the country had only 15 asylum seekers. Meanwhile, the proportion of Ukrainians living in that country is relatively small when compared with those in other V4 countries.

As of January 1, 2015, some 6,906 Ukrainian citizens had the right of permanent residence in Hungary. It should be noted that this number has been decreasing because of the liberalisation of requirements for acquiring Hungarian citizenship.
By April 2016, statistics already showed that after enactment of the law to simplify the procedure for acquiring Hungarian citizenship, more than 825,000 applications were made by foreigners and 762,000 had already received citizenship.

Altogether since 2001, a total of 30,000 Ukrainian citizens have migrated to Hungary, acquiring either Hungarian citizenship or the right of residence. Some 90% of these people came from four border districts in the Transcarpathian region. As of August 2015, more than 124,000 Ukrainians had applied for Hungarian citizenship.

Migration policy of Ukraine and V4 countries

Despite significant migration dynamics, Ukraine has had no proactive policy in the area of migration throughout the period of independence. This situation can be explained by the weakness of state institutions, their inability to formulate any kind of strategy on this area in the 1990s, and the political elite’s treatment of this issue as being among its lesser priorities in subsequent years (Jaroszewicz, Kaźmierkiewicz 2016).

In November 2015, in the context of preparations for the abolition of the visa regime with the EU, Ukraine adopted the Law On External Labour Migration. This identified social guarantees for workers and their families, including the possibility of social insurance while staying abroad, guaranteed reintegration after returning, thus providing protection abroad. Creating a system for the legal protection of workers has the potential to have a positive economic effect: in 2014 alone, migrant workers were transferred almost US$6 billion to Ukraine, compared with US$230 million of foreign investments in the domestic economy over the same period.

It should be noted that in recent years Central Europeans have not seen any significant negative impact of Ukrainian migration to Europe, apart from possible increased competition in the labour market. Furthermore, neighbouring countries did not pay much attention to the formation of migration policy, given that they considered the movement of people to have no significant effect on their direction of development. Even nowadays, experts note the absence of a clear strategy on migration policy in Poland and Hungary (Migration: Are we ready for it? 2016).

Since 2014 to 2015, an important role has been played by the factor of migrants from Syria, which improves the rejection attitude to immigrants from Eastern Europe. For example, before the parliamentary election of April 2015, the Muslim issue was used as one of the country’s biggest problems by Slovakia’s main parties – in particular the party of current prime minister Robert Fico.

Ukrainians have the greatest number of problems related to employment in Hungary because of the low education level of migrants there and the fact that their heaviest concentration is in depressed areas of northeastern Hungary, with the possession of only temporary work permits. Hungary is also a country with a high level
of xenophobia, particularly towards migrants, and public opinion accuses them of economic problems and high unemployment rates, even if they have no influence on these issues (Soltesz, Eross, Karacsonyi 2014).

However, the Muslim challenge led to V4 countries beginning to liberalise their policy on migrants from Eastern Europe. In particular, on November 9, 2015, the Government of the Czech Republic significantly simplified the procedure for professionals from Ukraine to obtain long-term work visas and declared its readiness to accept 500 highly qualified professionals with rare specialisms. This approach can be seen as a result of the growth of the Czech economy and the negative attitude to migration from the Middle East and North Africa. The government of Hungary started to adopt a similar position, proposing to take 100,000 Ukrainians in return for Eastern migrants quota.

Conclusions

1. It can be presupposed that a large number of refugees from the Donbas region can leave Ukraine only if military actions continue in the medium term, with a lack of opportunities to return home or unfavourable conditions for living where they are now settled and a deepening of political instability and economic crisis. In the event of maintenance of the status quo, more likely scenarios for leaving to go abroad on a permanent basis are as a choice made by a young, well-educated generation, and seasonal migration to neighbouring countries for residents in western regions.

2. The EU’s policy on refugees from the Middle East is a factor that should be taken into account when predicting the potential for migration. EU members may close their labour markets to Ukrainians or vice versa, and materialise the already-voiced statements of facilitating migration from Eastern Europe, especially for highly qualified specialists.

3. Potentially, the main objects to move may be the V4 countries, given the geographical and cultural proximity and existing social networks created Ukrainian. A negative factor that contributes to the worsening of migration attitudes may be deteriorating socio-economic conditions.

4. Liberal policy in V4 countries towards Ukrainian migrants can create additional pressure on the labour market, particularly if workers end up competing with citizens of the receiving countries in popular areas for employment. However, in recent years, residents in Central Europe have generally not considered the migration of Ukrainians to be a negative trend. Migration from the Middle East and the reaction of rejection to this process has played a role in improving attitudes towards natives of Eastern Europe.

5. The migration of professional experts can become one of the main features in a new wave of migration. This situation was assisted by the EU in May 2015
through a policy that declared a priority of giving job-seeking opportunities to talented professionals, particularly to researchers in different fields, engineers, representatives of the IT industry and doctors, using the mechanism of the Blue Card Directive.

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Ukrainos piliečių migracija į Vidurio Europos šalis vidaus ir tarptautinės krizės, nulemtos Maidano revoliucijos, kontekste

Myroslava Lendel

Anotacija

Straipsnyje analizuojamos Ukrainos piliečių migracijos į Europos Sąjungą, ypač Centrinės Europos šalis, pokyčių tendencijos po vadinamos Orumo revoliucijos ir prasidėjus ginkluotam Rusijos-Ukrainos konfliktui. Tyrimo metu nustatyta, kad nepaisant šalies viduje atsiradusio perkelto asmenų reiškinio, pagrindinis būdas, kuriuo Ukrainos piliečiai vyksta į Europą, išlieka darbo jėgos migracija. Tarp veiksnių, turėjusių įtakos piliečių judėjimui, yra Ukrainos, Europos Sąjungos ir Vidurio Europos šalių migracijos politika, kuri pabėgelių iš Artimųjų Rytų krizės akivaizdoje tapo dar pozityvesnė.

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