Ex post regulation as method of the public policy in the regulated sectors

Rafał Nagaj, Brigita Žuromskaitė

Abstract


The paper is a theoretical and empirical study addressing the issues of ex post regulation as a method of public policy to control selected sectors of the economy where market failures exist. The aim of the article is to explain the essence of ex post regulation, its types, advantages and disadvantages. This article will focus on the critical analysis of professional literature and the case study of the experiences of states that have applied this type of policy to the infrastructure sectors. Theoretical and empirical analysis indicates that it is not everywhere possible to apply this kind of state intervention. Such public policy requires the creation of some boundary conditions, such as restructuring or liberalization processes to ensure that competition mechanisms are so deeply rooted that its application will be effective and companies will not abuse their market position in relation to the consumer.


Keywords


ex post regulation, sectoral regulation, public policy, regulated sectors

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13165/VPA-17-16-4-02

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