The Problem of the Scientific Character of Legal Science and Jurisprudence

Eglė Mackuvienė


The article starts with the observation of A. F. Chalmers, philosopher of science, that there is neither a common concept of science, nor a common concept of scientific method which could be applied for every scientific branch in every stage of its evolution. The uncertainty of the definition of modern science could be indicated as the first problem in the discussion on the scientific character of law. The second problem arises when one tries to define the concepts of legal science and jurisprudence. The author of the article states that these concepts represent different approaches towards legal research: legal science focuses on value-neutral criteria, ideas, characteristics, considers legal norms as objectively existing social facts. Jurisprudence, in its turn, analyzes legal practice ant its methods “from the inside”, emphasizes legal knowledge, reasonableness, just decisions. According to some European legal scholars whose thoughts are discussed in the article, it is reasonable to indicate the specific branches of theoretical legal sciences, such as, for example, general theory of law, philosophy of law, history of law, law sociology, law and economics, law epistemology, law methodology, law and artificial intelligence studies, as well as general jurisprudential discourse.


jurisprudence; legal science; legal method; an object of legal science

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"Societal studies" ISSN online 2029-2244 / ISSN print 2029-2236